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A WINN FOR ORIGINALISM PUTS ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE REFORM WITHIN REACH
Patrick T. Gillen*

In Flast v. Cohen,1 the Supreme Court held that taxpayers could bring suits
challenging government expenditures alleged to violate the Establishment Clause.
Flast was a pivotal decision implicating two of the most difficult areas of constitutional law, the volatile interplay of law and religion,2 and the complex justiciability
doctrines the Court uses to determine its jurisdiction under Article III.3 In Flast the
Court took up this task as part of its effort to harmonize two fundamental interests,
the government’s power to tax and spend for the general welfare on the one hand,
and our individual right to religious liberty on the other.4 But Flast has proven
deeply problematic, with two sitting Justices and prominent academics calling for
its reversal.5
The Court’s most recent effort to deal with the troubled legacy of Flast is Arizona
School Tuition Organization v. Winn,6 in which the Supreme Court rejected a taxpayer challenge to a tuition tax credit that benefitted religious schools advanced under
Flast.7 Although decided only last term, Winn has already been criticized as being
inconsistent with Flast and the original understanding of the Establishment Clause.8
* Associate Professor of Law, Ave Maria Law School. Ph.D. (American History), University
of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Notre Dame; M.A., Fordham University; B.A., Providence
College. Former Law Clerk to the Hon. Daniel A. Manion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit and the Hon. Robert D. Potter of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina. The author would like to thank James W. Devine and Drew M.
Scott for their assistance.
1
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
2
Id. at 87.
3
Id. at 95–99.
4
Id. at 103–04, 105–06.
5
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 618–20 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring, joined by Thomas, J.). Academic considerations of Flast are legion, but for a recent
analysis calling for the outright reversal of Flast, see Douglas W. Kmiec, Standing Still—
Did The Roberts Court Narrow, but Not Overrule Flast to Allow Time to Re-think Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 509 (2008). Others suspect that Flast’s days are numbered. See Kyle Duncan, Misunderstanding Freedom from Religion: Two Cents on Madison’s
Three Pence, 9 NEV. L.J. 32, 61–62 (2008); Mark C. Rahdert, Court Reform and Breathing
Space Under the Establishment Clause, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 835, 863–65 (2012).
6
131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
7
Id. at 1440.
8
For another discussion of Winn reaching a very different conclusion but acknowledging this pattern, see William P. Marshall & Gene R. Nichol, Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing
Standing and the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 215 n.3, 251–52.
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I disagree. Quite the contrary, I believe that Winn puts the Supreme Court within
reach of a comprehensive reform of its taxpayer standing doctrine that is both principled and consistent with the original understanding of the provision. For the same
reason, I do not believe that Flast needs to be overruled in order to address the serious problems the decision has created; it simply needs to be limited along the lines
suggested by Winn.
In Winn, the Supreme Court recognized that in order to demonstrate standing
under the Establishment Clause a taxpayer must be able to show a personal injury
caused by the use of the taxing power; more specifically, that the government has
used its taxing power to “extrac[t]” money from the taxpayer that is later used to
support religion.9 Winn makes plain that a taxpayer cannot show the injury needed
to support standing simply by pointing to a use of the taxing power that provides
some generalized benefit to religious institutions.10 Much needed reform of Flast can
be achieved simply by employing the more refined focus used in Winn to isolate the
precise spending of public funds that creates a taxpayer injury that is cognizable
under the Establishment Clause.
The Court should recognize that the type of spending that violates the Establishment Clause, creating the taxpayer injury cognizable under the Establishment Clause,
is an extremely narrow category of expenditures that use public funds to support
what the Court has called “inherently religious” activity.11 In so doing, the Court
will obviate the basis for taxpayer challenges to the vast range of spending programs
through which government and religious entities cooperate to advance legitimate
social goals. It will do so by recognizing that the Establishment Clause was not
understood to bar spending programs that advance secular goals through providing
funding to religious organizations, even if such spending provides a collateral benefit
to religious institutions, and consequently, that such programs do not give rise to a
taxpayer injury cognizable under the Establishment Clause. The Court has an historic reform of its precedent within reach.
In Part I, I briefly sketch the original understanding of the Establishment Clause
and show that it was not understood to prohibit spending programs that extended
benefits to religious institutions providing general social welfare services. I argue
that while the rationale for taxpayer standing in Flast is consistent with the original
understanding of the First Amendment, the actual holding in Flast represented an
historically unsupported and unsound expansion of claims that were cognizable
under the Establishment Clause.12
In Part II, I survey Supreme Court cases entertaining challenges to spending
programs that conferred some arguable benefit on religious entities from Flast
9
10
11
12

Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106).
Id.
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 605 (1988).
See infra notes 91–99 and accompanying text.
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through Mitchell v. Helms.13 This section shows that the flaws in Flast led the Court
to adopt a series of presumptions that were designed to remedy the problem created
by the Flast decision, namely, allowing taxpayer challenges to spending programs
without requiring a showing that public funds were actually being used to advance
religion. The Court remedied this fatal flaw in many challenges to spending programs advanced under Flast by presuming that spending programs which provided
some benefit to institutions with a pervasively sectarian character must be presumed
to advance religion. In effect, such presumptions, which the Court often employed
when addressing Establishment Clause claims on the merits, served as a gap-filler
that remedied a defect in standing that can be traced back to Flast.
In Part III, I consider Supreme Court case law addressing taxpayer standing for
Establishment Clause claims between Flast and Winn and show that cases testing
the limits of Frothingham v. Mellon14 and Flast have led the Court to a more refined
focus on the precise injury that a taxpayer must show to support standing under the
Establishment Clause. These cases helped pave the way for Winn, which requires
a sharper focus on the specific use of the taxing power that creates the taxpayer
injury made cognizable in Flast.15
In Part IV, I argue that the Court must use the same refined focus it used in
Winn when it evaluates challenges to spending programs advanced under Flast. In
Winn, a use of the taxing power that provided a generalized benefit to religion did
not inflict the taxpayer injury made cognizable in Flast.16 By the same token, a use
of the spending power that provides a generalized benefit to religion does not inflict
the taxpayer injury properly deemed cognizable under Flast.17 Therefore, a taxpayer
seeking to proceed under Flast must allege and later prove that public funds are in
fact being used to finance inherently religious activity, not merely that public funds
provide a benefit to religious institutions.18 If the Court narrows the focus of the
standing inquiry to the actual use of public funds, it can achieve a comprehensive
reform of its taxpayer standing doctrine that is consistent with both the original
understanding of the Establishment Clause and the gravamen of controlling precedent in the area.
I.
Brief attention to the historical controversy surrounding the use of civil law to
coerce support for religion helps establish the framework needed to determine the
13
14
15
16
17
18

530 U.S. 793 (2000).
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1447–48.
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proper scope and extent of taxpayer standing under Flast. As is well known, coerced
support for religion was a feature of the established church in England, where the
King mandated tithing to the local parish and took royal revenues from taxes levied
on the clergy, who were said to hold their offices through him.19 And although many
early colonists fled England to avoid the established church, some colonies used
civil law to coerce financial support for religion, a practice that was at the heart of
the struggle to define and protect religious liberty.20
Many of the state constitutions drafted during the Revolutionary and Early
National periods specifically addressed the use of civil law to compel financial
support for religion.21 Some constitutional provisions expressly prohibited legally
compelled support for religion without qualification.22 Several of the constitutions
19

See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 93, 175–76
(1897); see also Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 346, 351 (2002) (noting the widely shared view that “conscience would be violated
if citizens were required to pay taxes to support religious institutions with whose beliefs they
disagreed”); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding,
Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105 (2003) (providing an
excellent review of “establishment” as understood in Great Britain and the United States).
20
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 19, at 2152–53; see also NICHOLAS TROTT, THE LAWS
OF THE BRITISH PLANTATIONS IN AMERICA, RELATING TO THE CHURCH AND THE CLERGY,
RELIGION AND LEARNING (B. Cowse ed., 1720) (providing a comprehensive catalogue of colonial laws implementing various measures along the lines of the English establishment Trott
wished to have legislated for the colonies). For more wide-ranging discussions of the state constitutional provisions, see GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA
(1987); THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 134–92 (1986); 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES, 258–444 (1950); see also MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN
AUTHORITY & LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1997)
(discussing how the state constitutions reflect an effort to balance natural rights against the
need to preserve the public order).
21
For a detailed examination of the mechanics of this process, see BRADLEY, supra note
20, at 19–57; CURRY, supra note 20, at 134–92; STOKES, supra note 20, at 258–444; see
also WILLIAM GEORGE TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA
14 (1948).
22
See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 5, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 789 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (“All persons shall have the free exercise of religion, without being
obliged to contribute to the support of any religious profession but their own.”); GA. CONST.
of 1777, art. LVI, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 784 (“All
persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion . . . and shall not, unless by
consent, support any teacher or teachers except those of their own profession.”); N.J. CONST.
of 1776, art. XVIII, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2597
(“[N]or shall any person . . . ever be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or any other rates, for the
purpose of building or repairing any other church or churches, place or places of worship,
or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry . . . .”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV,
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that allowed compelled support for religion did so in language that barred compelled
support for a religion contrary to a citizen’s religious conviction.23 And some of the
provisions authorizing coerced support for religion left open an alternative use of
revenues generated by provisions mandating support for religion.24
There is no question that the use of civil law to coerce support for religion
provided an impetus for the religious liberty provision of the First Amendment. For
example, an Anti-federalist writing as “A Countryman” opposed ratification in part
because he feared that the power to lay and collect taxes for the general welfare,
combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, gave the federal government the
power to enact laws concerning religion.25 Other Anti-federalists expressed similar
reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2793 (“[N]or [shall any person]
be obliged to pay, for the purchase of any glebe, or the building of any house of worship, or
for the maintenance of any minister or ministry . . . .”); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, reprinted
in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3082 (“[N]o man ought or of right can
be compelled to . . . erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry . . . .”);
S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra, at 3257 (“No person shall, by law, be obliged to pay towards the maintenance and
support of a religious worship that he does not freely join in, or has not voluntarily engaged
to support.”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. III, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3740 (“[N]o man ought, or of right can be compelled to . . .
support any place of worship, or maintain any minister . . . .”).
23
See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. III, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 22, at 1890 (“[A]ll moneys [sic] paid by the subject . . . shall, if he require
it, be uniformly applied to the support of the public teacher or teachers of his own religious
sect or denomination . . . .”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, part I, art. I, § VI, reprinted in 4 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 22, 2454 (“[T]he people of this state . . . hereby fully
impower [sic] the legislature to authorize [communities] . . . to make adequate provision at
their own expence [sic], for the support and maintenance of public protestant teachers of
piety, religion and morality: Provided notwithstanding, That . . . [communities] shall at all
times have the exclusive right of electing their own public teachers . . . . And no portion of
any one particular religious sect or denomination, shall ever be compelled to pay towards the
support of the teacher or teachers of another persuasion, sect or denomination.”).
24
See, e.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 22, at 1689 (“[N]or ought any person to be compelled to frequent or
maintain, or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain any particular place of worship, or
any particular ministry; yet the Legislature may, in their discretion, lay a general and equal
tax, for the support of the Christian religion; leaving to each individual the power of appointing the payment over of the money, collected from him, to the support of any particular place
of worship or minister, or for the benefit of the poor of his own denomination, or the poor
in general of any particular county . . . .”).
25
Letters from a Countryman, N.Y. J., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 86–87 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“[W]e have often read, and heard of governments, under various pretences [sic], breaking in . . . upon the rights of conscience particularly;
for in most of the old countries, their rulers, it seems, have thought it for the general welfare
to establish particular forms of religion, and make every body worship God in a certain way,
whether the people thought it right or no, and punish them severely, if they would not . . . .”).
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concerns.26 Scholars have long recognized that the dispute over laws enacted to
provide financial support for religion were at the heart of the debate surrounding the
religious liberty provisions of the state and federal constitutions.27
But there is another side of the story that is equally clear. This dispute centered
on the use of civil power to coerce financial support for what can be thought of as
archetypal religious activity, i.e., supporting ministers and religious denominations
so they could engage in activities such as preaching and worship.28 The great controversy concerning use of civil power to coerce financial support for religion
present during the Revolutionary and Early National period was not directed towards the use of public funds to support religious entities providing secular services
such as education.29
The narrow focus of the original liberty provisions on compelled support for
inherently religious activity becomes clearer if the controversial practice of using
civil law to coerce financial support for inherently religious activities is contrasted with
another widespread practice, which existed for one hundred years after the religious
liberty provisions were ratified but proved noncontroversial. It is well known that
in the early days of our nation’s history, public funds were granted to religious entities performing social services such as schools, orphanages, asylums, or hospitals.30
26

See Essay by Deliberator, FREEMAN’S J., Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 25, at 179; see also Essays of an Old Whig, INDEP. GAZETTEER,
reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 25, at 36–37.
27
Scholars agree on this point even while differing over the precise scope of the prohibition. For prominent examples of the so-called “separationists” approach to this issue, see CURRY,
supra note 20, at 134–92 (arguing that the Establishment Clause prohibits use of civil law
to compel support for one state-preferred religion); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE 107–08 (1994) (arguing that in some states, ratification of the Bill of Rights was delayed due to fear that the federal government could impose religious taxes); see also FRANK
LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA (2003) (arguing
that the Founders sought to remove government power over religion in order to create a free
market of religious ideas along lines akin to those suggested in Adam Smith’s The Wealth
of Nations). For prominent examples of the so-called “non-preferentialists” interpretation,
see BRADLEY, supra note 20, at 113 (arguing that the Establishment Clause prohibits sect
preference); ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982) (arguing that the
First Amendment does not “preclude Federal governmental aid to religion when it [is]
provided on a nondiscriminatory basis”); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE 483 (2002) (arguing that the no-aid principle endorsed by anti-aid strict separationists
cannot be squared with historical understanding).
28
See generally Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of the Establishment,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 936–39 (1986) (arguing that the Establishment Clause should
be understood as a reflection of the Framers’ concern that people would be coerced into joining a religion other than their own); McConnell, supra note 19.
29
See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 20, at 125–27 (arguing that schools in the postRevolutionary period were widely seen as “religiously grounded” and encouraged to teach
“piety” and “religious . . . virtue”).
30
John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 379–80 (1996).
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This longstanding practice became politically controversial in the second half of the
nineteenth century because of a nativist reaction to large-scale immigration by ethnic groups that were predominantly Roman Catholic.31
The result was a set of proposed constitutional amendments to the federal and
state constitutions beginning in the mid-1870s, designed to ensure that public money
was not transferred to private “sectarian” institutions.32 The effort to amend the federal constitution to prohibit this practice, the so-called Blaine Amendment, failed.33
But many state constitutions were amended to include prohibitions based on the
Blaine Amendment. These so-called Blaine Amendments contributed to broader restrictions on public aid by disqualifying institutions (including those institutions providing secular services) from receiving public aid based on their religious character.34
31

See BRADLEY supra note 20, at 32, 44–45; HAMBURGER, supra note 27, at 201–29;
Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, The Blaine Amendment of 1876: Private Motives for Political
Action, 42 CATH. HIST. REV. 15, 26 (1956) (illustrating the public outrage at the request by
the Catholic communities to receive public funding for private religious schools and that they
be allowed to educate their children in Catholic schools only or to introduce Catholic teachings into public schools’ curricula); F. William O’Brien, The Blaine Amendment, 1875–76,
41 U. DET. L.J. 137, 137–47 (1963); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, The
First Amendment, And State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 666–67
(1998). For the view that the Blaine Amendments, which twenty-nine states added to their
constitutions to ensure that no funding would be given to sectarian schools, proceeded, in
part, from an emerging (and positive) value of non-sectarianism, as well as anti-Catholicism,
see Noah Feldman, Non-sectarianism Reconsidered, 18 J.L. & POL. 65, 110–12 (2002).
32
See HAMBURGER, supra note 27, at 287–334 (describing the Liberalists’ campaign to
promote separation with a constitutional amendment); see also Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine
Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939, 941 (1951); O’Brien, supra note 31,
at 138–43 (discussing the Blaine Amendment); Klinkhamer, supra note 31 (detailing the history of the Blaine Amendment); Viteritti, supra note 31, at 670 (noting that President Grant
wrote to Congress to “propos[e] a constitutional amendment that would deny public support
to religious institutions”).
33
HAMBURGER, supra note 27, at 324–25. The Blaine Amendment provided that:
[n]o state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation
in any State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor [sic], nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be
under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or
lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.
44 CONG. REC. 205 (1875).
34
See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. XIV § 263 (“No money raised for the support of the public
schools, shall be appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian or denominational
school.”); ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“No money shall be paid from public funds for the
direct benefit of any religious or other private educational institution.”); ARIZ. CONST. art.
IX, § 10 (“No tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in aid of any church,
or private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation.”); CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8
(“No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of any sectarian or denominational school . . . .”); COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (“Neither the general assembly, nor any
county, city, town, township, school district or other public corporation, shall ever make any
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appropriation . . . to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university
or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church or sectarian denomination
whatsoever . . . .”); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3 (“No portion of any fund now existing, or which
may hereafter be appropriated, or raised by tax, for educational purposes, shall be appropriated to, or used by, or in aid of any sectarian, church or denominational school . . . .”); FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 3 (“No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall
ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.”); HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1 (“[N]or
shall public funds be appropriated for the support or benefit of any sectarian or nonsectarian
private educational institution, except that proceeds of special purpose revenue bonds authorized or issued under section 12 of Article VII may be appropriated to finance or assist: 1.
Not-for-profit corporations that provide early childhood education and care facilities serving
the general public; and 2. Not-for-profit private nonsectarian and sectarian elementary schools,
secondary schools, colleges and universities.”); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5 (“Neither the legislature nor any county, city, town, township, school district, or other public corporation, shall
ever make any appropriation . . . to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary,
college, university or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church, sectarian or religious denomination whatsoever . . . .”); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3 (“Neither the General
Assembly nor any county, city, town, township, school district, or other public corporation,
shall ever make any appropriation . . . in aid of any church or sectarian purpose . . . .”); IND.
CONST. art. I, § 6 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution.”); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3 (“[N]or shall any person be compelled to attend any place of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing
places of worship, or the maintenance of any minister, or ministry.”); KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 6(c)
(“No religious sect or sects shall control any part of the public educational funds.”); KY. CONST.
§ 189 (“No portion of any fund . . . shall be appropriated to, or used by, or in aid of, any church,
sectarian or denominational school.”); MASS. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2 (“No grant, appropriation
or use of public money or property or loan of credit shall be made or authorized by the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any . . . primary or secondary school, or charitable or religious undertaking which is not
publicly owned and under the exclusive control, order and supervision of public officers . . . .”);
MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or
any public credit utilized . . . to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary school.”); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (“In no
case shall any public money or property be appropriated or used for the support of schools
wherein the distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of any particular Christian or other religious sect are promulgated or taught.”); MISS. CONST. art. 8, § 208 (“No religious or other
sect or sects shall ever control any part of the school or other educational funds of this state;
nor shall any funds be appropriated toward the support of any sectarian school.”); MO. CONST.
art. I, § 5 (“Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school district or
other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation . . . to help to support or sustain
any private or public school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other institution of
learning controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian denomination whatever . . . .”);
MONT. CONST. art. 10, § 6(1) (“The legislature, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and
public corporations shall not make any direct or indirect appropriation . . . to aid any church,
school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination.”); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11
(“[A]ppropriation of public funds shall not be made to any school or institution of learning
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not owned or exclusively controlled by the state or a political subdivision thereof; Provided,
that the Legislature may provide that the state or any political subdivision thereof may contract with institutions not wholly owned or controlled by the state or any political subdivision
to provide for educational or other services for the benefit of children under the age of twentyone years who are handicapped, as that term is from time to time defined by the Legislature,
if such services are nonsectarian in nature.”); NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 2 (“[A]ny school district
which shall allow instruction of a sectarian character therein may be deprived of its proportion of the interest of the public school fund during such neglect or infraction . . . .”); id. § 9
(“No sectarian instruction shall be imparted or tolerated in any school or University that may
be established under this Constitution.”); id. §10 (“No public funds of any kind or character
whatever, State, County or Municipal, shall be used for sectarian purpose.”); N.H. CONST.
pt. 2, art. 83 (“[N]o money raised by taxation shall ever be granted or applied for the use of
the schools or institutions of any religious sect or denomination.”); N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3
(“[N]o part of the proceeds arising from the sale or disposal of any lands granted to the state
by congress, or any other funds appropriated, levied or collected for educational purposes,
shall be used for the support of any sectarian, denominational or private school, college or
university.”); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (“Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof, shall
use its property . . . in aid or maintenance . . . of any school or institution of learning wholly
or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught, but the legislature may provide for the transportation
of children to and from any school or institution of learning.”); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5
(“No money raised for the support of the public schools of the state shall be appropriated to
or used for the support of any sectarian school.”); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“[N]o religious or
other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school
funds of this state.”); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5 (“No public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support
of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support
of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.”); OR. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the
benefit of any religeous [sic], or theological institution, nor shall any money be appropriated
for the payment of any religeous [sic] services in either house of the Legislative Assembly.”);
PA. CONST. art. III, § 15 (“No money raised for the support of the public schools of the Commonwealth shall be appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian school.”); id. § 29
(“No appropriation shall be made for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes to any
person or community nor to any denominational and sectarian institution, corporation or association.”); S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (“No money shall be paid from public funds nor shall
the credit of the State or any of its political subdivisions be used for the direct benefit of any
religious or other private educational institution.”); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 16 (“No appropriation of lands, money, or other property or credits to aid any sectarian school shall ever
be made by the state . . . to be used for sectarian purposes, and no sectarian instruction shall
be allowed in any school or institution aided or supported by the state.”); TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 7 (“No money shall be appropriated, or drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of any sect,
or religious society, theological or religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the
State be appropriated for any such purposes.”); UTAH CONST. art. X, § 9 (“Neither the state
of Utah nor its political subdivisions may make any appropriation for the direct support of
any school or educational institution controlled by any religious organization.”); VA. CONST.
art. VIII, § 10 (“No appropriation of public funds shall be made to any school or institution
of learning not owned or exclusively controlled by the State or some political subdivision
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The salient point is that these amendments were premised on the recognition that
existing state constitutional provisions did not prohibit the funding of religious entities providing secular services.35 Indeed, critics of the Blaine Amendment pointed
out that the federal provision also did not prohibit this practice.36 Put simply, spending programs that used public funds to pay religious entities providing social services did not violate the original religious liberty provisions contained in the federal
and state constitutions. Consequently, additional constitutional amendments were
necessary in order to prohibit the practice.
The Court utterly disregarded this larger historical context when it dealt with
early claims challenging expenditures that violated the Establishment Clause. A
handful of early cases, Bradfield v. Roberts,37 Everson v. Board of Education,38 and
Flast itself, provide stark illustrations of the Court’s failure to systematically consider the specific types of spending that would violate the Establishment Clause.39
These cases failed to place challenges to spending programs providing some benefit
to religious institutions in historical context and employed a free-wheeling analysis
inconsistent with the rigorous focus on the actual use of public funds which the
thereof . . . .”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any
religious establishment . . . .”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (“[N]or shall any money be drawn from
the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.”); id.
art. X, § 3 (“[N]o sectarian instruction shall be allowed [in the public schools]; but the legislature by law may, for the purpose of religious instruction outside the district schools, authorize the release of students during regular school hours.”); WYO. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“No
money of the state shall ever be given or appropriated to any sectarian or religious society
or institution.”); D.C. CODE § 44-715 (2012) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
government of the United States to make no appropriation of money or property for the purpose of founding, maintaining, or aiding by payment for services, expenses, or otherwise, any
church or religious denomination, or any institution or society which is under sectarian or
ecclesiastical control; and no money appropriated for charitable purposes in the District of
Columbia shall be paid to any church or religious denomination, or to any institution or
society which is under sectarian or ecclesiastical control.”).
35
See HAMBURGER, supra note 27, at 296, 324 (noting that Liberals proposed such amendments because of the lack of constitutional protection for the separation of church and state);
O’Brien, supra note 31, at 203–04 (noting that many politicians did not believe the Establishment
Clause captured what the Blaine Amendments did).
36
See DOUGLAS W. KMIEC ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 228 (2009)
(citing O’Brien, supra note 31, at 204).
37
175 U.S. 291 (1899).
38
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
39
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-106 (1968) (declining to state an opinion on the
merits, deciding on standing alone); Everson, 330 U.S. at 8–18 (focusing on the history of
the Amendment and whether the services provided were “so separate and so indisputably
marked off from the religious function” that the provision would not offend the First
Amendment); Bradfield, 175 U.S. at 297-300 (finding federal funding of a private hospital
run by monastic brothers and sisters of the Roman Catholic Church not to be a violation of
the Establishment Clause).
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Court used to evaluate taxpayer standing for alleged violations of the Establishment
Clause in Doremus v. Board of Education.40 The result was to create a tension in the
Court’s case law that Flast resolved incorrectly.41 A brief examination of these cases
puts Flast in context and goes a long way to explaining why the decision has proved
so controversial and so troublesome.
In Bradfield, a federal taxpayer claimed that a contract under which the District
of Columbia paid a private hospital operated by a Roman Catholic religious order for
providing care to poor patients sent there by the District violated the Establishment
Clause.42 The Court of Appeals had specifically held that Bradfield had standing as
a taxpayer to challenge the contract.43 It held that the Establishment Clause did not
bar use of public funds to pay a private corporation operated by religious entities for
providing services to the public based in large part on the fact that the federal constitution did not include a Blaine Amendment.44
The Supreme Court deliberately passed over “objections . . . to the character in
which the complainant sues, [which was] merely that of a citizen and taxpayer.”45
The Court went on to consider Bradfield’s claim that payments to the hospital, a
private corporation run by a religious order, violated the Establishment Clause because “public funds are being used and pledged for the advancement and support of
a . . . sectarian corporation . . . contrary to the Constitution.”46 Here, the Court
assumed for the purpose of deciding the case that paying public funds to a sectarian
40

342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (requiring a direct injury, which, in the case of a taxpayer, is
satisfied “only when it is a good-faith pocket book action”); see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 102–03
(requiring only a “logical link” or “nexus”).
41
See Richard Murphy, Abandoning Standing: Trading a Rule of Access for a Rule of
Deference, 60 ADMIN L. REV. 943, 955 (2008) (criticizing Flast for making standing about
whether a plaintiff “will try hard enough”).
42
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 292 (1899).
43
Roberts v. Bradfield, 12 App. D.C. 453, 459–60 (D.C. Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 291
(1899).
44
Id. at 472 (noting a Blaine Amendment in the Illinois’s constitution). The Court continued:
As we have before remarked, all the States seem to have provisions in
their constitutions of the same general purport as the First Amendment
to the Federal Constitution, which have not been regarded as interfering
with the incorporation of churches or sectarian establishments. But many
of them, also, contain special prohibitions of donations or grants of public money in aid of such establishments.
Id.; see also id. at 475 (referencing decisions made under states’ Blaine Amendments and
continuing “[b]earing in mind the essential difference between the constitutional prohibition
controlling the foregoing [state] decisions, respectively, and that of the Federal Constitution,
which governs here, we do not find any necessary antagonism between them and the conclusion at which we have arrived; on the contrary, inferences, logically deducible therefrom,
would seem to support that conclusion”).
45
Bradfield, 175 U.S. at 295.
46
Id. at 293, 295.
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corporation would be “invalid, as resulting indirectly in the passage of an act respecting an establishment of religion.”47 But after considering Bradfield’s allegations
that the hospital was run by a corporation that was owned and controlled by a religious order operating under the auspices of the Catholic Church, the Court concluded
that this did not “change the legal character of the corporation or render it . . . a
religious or sectarian body,” and did not “change the legal character of the hospital,
or make a religious corporation out of a purely secular one as constituted by the law
of its being,” and rejected Bradfield’s claim.48
In Everson, a state taxpayer challenged a program that reimbursed parents for bus
fares paid to transport their children to Catholic parochial schools on the grounds
that it violated the Establishment Clause.49 The Court engaged in a lengthy exploration of the purpose of the First Amendment reasoning that “[w]hether this . . . law
is one respecting an ‘establishment of religion’ requires an understanding of the
meaning of that language, particularly with respect to the imposition of taxes.”50
Describing the abuses associated with the establishing of religion in terms of sectpreference and penalties for nonconformity, it noted “all of these dissenters were
compelled to pay tithes and taxes to support the government-sponsored churches . . .
[t]he imposition of taxes to pay ministers’ salaries and to build and maintain churches
and church property aroused their indignation,” and “[i]t was these feelings which
found expression in the First Amendment.”51
As it had in prior cases,52 the Court referred to the struggle for religious freedom
in Virginia as illustrative of the practices which had spurred people to “reach[] the
conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or
all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.”53
The Court reasoned that the provisions of the First Amendment “had the same
objective and were intended to provide the same protection against governmental
intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute.”54 The Court also referenced the
47

Id. at 297 (“If we were to assume, for the purpose of this question only, that under this
appropriation an agreement with a religious corporation of the tenor of this agreement would
be invalid, as resulting indirectly in the passage of an act respecting an establishment of religion, we are unable to see that the complainant in his bill shows that the corporation is of the
kind described, but on the contrary he has clearly shown that it is not.”).
48
Id. at 297–98.
49
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3, 8 (1947).
50
Id. at 8.
51
Id. at 10, 11.
52
See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–65 (1878) (describing debates
over civil laws compelling financial supports for religious sects); cf. Terrett v. Taylor, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 46–48 (1815) (discussing the struggle in the context of a property dispute
in which Virginia sought to reclaim land).
53
Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
54
Id. at 13.
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controversies concerning the use of public funds to provide financial support for
religious schools that had produced the Blaine Amendments, while noting that decisions under those provisions “show the difficulty in drawing the line between tax
legislation which provides funds for the welfare of the general public and that which
is designed to support institutions which teach religion.”55
The Court concluded that the Establishment Clause was designed to ensure that
“[n]o tax in any amount . . . can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called,”56 and as a consequence “New Jersey
cannot . . . contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches
the tenets and faith of any church.”57 But it also acknowledged that the Establishment Clause should not be interpreted to prohibit citizens from “receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation” regardless of their religious beliefs.58 Ultimately,
it held that the Establishment Clause did not “prohibit[] New Jersey from spending
tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other schools.”59
Emphasizing that the “State contributes no money to the schools,” the Court concluded that the program did not violate the wall of separation between church and
state it deemed required by the First Amendment.60
The Court’s failure to analyze standing in these cases, when combined with its
flawed historical analysis, created a tension in the case law under the Establishment
Clause. The root cause of the tension was the Court’s decision in Frothingham,
which created the bar on taxpayer grievances. In Frothingham, a federal taxpayer
argued that the Maternity Act of 192161 violated the Tenth Amendment and sought
to enjoin implementation of the statute arguing that the spending authorized by the
Maternity Act would result in increased taxation, which, in turn, would deprive her
of property without due process of law.62
The Court dismissed Frothingham’s claim for lack of standing reasoning that
“[t]he administration of any statute, likely to produce additional taxation . . . is
essentially a matter of public and not of individual concern,” and noting that to
allow standing here would authorize any taxpayer to challenge the legality of any
statute involving an outlay of public funds.63 Describing the separation of powers
concerns that would be presented if taxpayer suits supported judicial interference
with the legislative function, the Court emphasized that a party seeking to enjoin a
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921).
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
Id. at 487.

1120

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:1107

statute “must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has
sustained . . . some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that
he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”64 For these
reasons, it concluded that Frothingham failed to allege such an injury and that her
claim, in essence, was “merely that officials of the executive department of the government [were] executing . . . an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional.”65
The Court’s first effort to address the implications of Frothingham for taxpayer
claims under the Establishment Clause was Doremus, which involved a state taxpayer’s challenge to a New Jersey statute that required reading of five verses of the
Bible and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer.66 The state supreme court had passed over
a jurisdictional objection based on the plaintiffs’ status as taxpayers, and held that
reading the Old Testament and Lord’s Prayer did not constitute sectarian instruction
or worship and therefore did not violate the Establishment Clause.67 When the case
came to the Supreme Court for review, the plaintiffs’ appeal was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.68
The Court began by scrutinizing the complaint that alleged taxpayer status and
emphasizing that “there is no averment that the Bible reading increases any tax they
do pay or that as taxpayers they are, will, or possibly can be out of pocket because
of it.”69 It then observed that in order to advance a claim a taxpayer “must be able
to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained . . . some direct
injury . . . not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally,”70 and conceded that a “taxpayer’s action can meet this test, but only
when it is a good-faith pocketbook action.”71 Finding no cost associated with the contested practice, the Court dismissed the case on the ground that “the grievance . . .
here is not a direct dollars-and-cents injury but is a religious difference.”72
Doremus seemed to require a taxpayer advancing an Establishment Clause
claim to allege and later prove that the practice alleged to violate the Establishment
Clause actually caused a use of public funds. But then came Flast, which took a
different approach to the matter. The result was to create a body of precedent far

64

Id. at 488.
Id. The Court affirmed the dismissal of Frothingham’s claim on the grounds that deciding the question presented “would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a
position of authority over the governmental acts of another coequal department, an authority
which we plainly do not possess.” Id. at 489.
66
Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 430 (1952).
67
Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 75 A.2d 880, 889 (N.J. 1950).
68
Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434–35.
69
Id. at 433.
70
Id. at 434.
71
Id.
72
Id.
65
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removed from—indeed at odds with—the original understanding of the Establishment Clause.73
Flast was a federal taxpayer suit claiming that the provisions of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA)74 violated the First Amendment.75
Plaintiffs, as federal taxpayers, argued that the First Amendment barred implementation of those portions of the ESEA using public funds to provide students enrolled
in private schools, including religious schools, with services (special education, for
example), as well as the use of instructional materials (textbooks, for example).76
The Court recognized that the first question was whether the claim could be advanced in light of its decision in Frothingham.77
After a lengthy review of justiciability doctrine, the Court held that taxpayers
had standing if they could meet two requirements.78 The first requirement obliged
the taxpayer to show a logical nexus between the status as taxpayer and the type of
legislation challenged. Here, the Court held that “a taxpayer will be a proper party
to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the
taxing and spending clause,”79 while citing Doremus for the proposition that it would
“not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute.”80 The second prong required the taxpayer
to establish a nexus between taxpayer status and “the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.”81 The Court explained that this requirement obliged the
taxpayer to “show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power.”82
The Court found the taxpayers satisfied both of these requirements.83 With
respect to the first requirement, the Court noted that the ESEA was an exercise of
the tax and spend power.84 Turning to the second prong, the Court observed “history
vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the
73

See generally William F. Cox, Jr., The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and
Its Application to Education, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 111 (2000) (“Over the last half-century, the
Court has wrongly interpreted the [First] Amendment, resulting in decisions contradictory . . .
to Founding-era interpretations . . . .”).
74
Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
75
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
76
Id. at 87.
77
Id. at 85, 91–92.
78
Id. at 101.
79
Id. at 102.
80
Id. At the same time, the Court foreclosed challenges based on “an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute,” using Doremus
as an illustration of this point. Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 102–03.
83
Id. at 103.
84
Id.
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Establishment Clause . . . was that the taxing and spending power would be used to
favor one religion over another or to support religion in general.”85 Relying on this
historical evidence, the Court concluded that the Establishment Clause “operates as
a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and
spending power.”86 The Court then held that the “complaint contains sufficient
allegations under the criteria we have outlined to give them standing to invoke a
federal court’s jurisdiction for an adjudication on the merits.”87
The decision in Flast rests on three elements. The first is the Court’s definition
of the harm to taxpayers made cognizable under the Establishment Clause—the use
of the tax and spend power to take a citizen’s money and use it to support religion.88
The second is the two-pronged test that the Court fashioned for the stated purpose
of identifying the claims that could be advanced by taxpayers.89 The third is the
Court’s actual holding, which applied the newly minted test to hold that the allegations advanced in Flast were sufficient to show an injury cognizable under the
Establishment Clause.90
The opinion in Flast has a certain superficial appeal, but when the holding is
viewed in historical context it is clear that Flast erred when it defined the “precise
nature of the constitutional infringement alleged”91 for the purpose of the second
prong of its standing analysis, and applied its newly minted test to hold that the
taxpayers had standing. Flast’s historically flawed analysis essentially assumed the
point at issue, that is, whether a use of public funds which provided a benefit to religious schools, but did not finance inherently religious activity, inflicted a taxpayer
injury sufficient to support standing.
The root of this error lay in Bradfield and Everson. In Bradfield, the Court
assumed (albeit “for the purpose of this question only”) that spending public funds
to compensate a religious entity for providing social services would violate the
Establishment Clause.92 The Court of Appeals had rejected this proposition by noting that the federal constitution did not feature a Blaine Amendment, only the First
Amendment, and the federal government’s long history of contracting with religious
entities demonstrated that the First was not understood to bar the practice (although
the practice was barred in states with Blaine Amendments).93 In Everson, the Court
mustered evidence that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause was intended
85

Id.
Id. at 104.
87
Id. at 106.
88
Id. at 103.
89
Id. at 102.
90
Id. at 106.
91
Id. at 102.
92
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297 (1899).
93
Roberts v. Bradfield, 12 App. D.C. 453, 466, 471, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S.
291 (1899).
86
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to bar use of the tax and spend power to coerce support for inherently religious
activity.94 It even went so far as to note the controversy surrounding the Blaine
Amendments and the fact that state courts deciding cases under them encountered
“difficulty in drawing the line between tax legislation which provides funds for the
welfare of the general public and that which is designed to support institutions which
teach religion.”95 Yet the Court failed to appreciate that the Blaine Amendments
represented a redrawing of that difficult line in a way that plainly indicated that the
use of public funds to provide a support to religious institutions delivering secular
services did not violate the First Amendment.
Flast relied on the inaccurate historical analysis of Everson when it held that the
Establishment Clause prohibited the use of public funds authorized by the ESEA.
Worse still, in Flast the Court relied on Everson’s historical error to hold that the
mere allegation that spending authorized by the ESEA provided a benefit to religious schools was cognizable as a “constitutional infringement” under the Establishment Clause.96 In Doremus, the Court had required the taxpayer to demonstrate that
the practice said to violate the Establishment Clause actually required a use of public
funds.97 But in Flast, the Court did not require the taxpayers to show how the ESEA
actually used public funds to support inherently religious activity—it just assumed
public funds were being used to advance religion because ESEA aid was going to
students enrolled in religious institutions.98 The errors that followed from the flawed
historical analysis in Everson and Flast would have far-reaching and pernicious
consequences for the Court’s effort to craft a stable body of precedent under the
Establishment Clause.
II.
The decision in Flast resulted in a multiplicity of taxpayer challenges to spending programs that conferred some benefit on religious entities.99 The Court was then
forced to determine the specific uses of public funds that violated the Establishment
94

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
Id. at 14.
96
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 87, 102 (1967).
97
Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
98
Flast, 392 U.S. at 103.
99
See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Comm. for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For an analytical
perspective reviewing district court decisions in religion and school cases for common trends
and the number of factors that appear to come into play in those decisions, see Michael Heise
& Gregory C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decision Making: An Empirical Perspective,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 185 (2012).
95

1124

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:1107

Clause and give some explanation for its decision. This question had been given
short shrift in Flast, even as it purported to define the injury to taxpayers prohibited
by the Establishment Clause and therefore sufficient to support standing. But the
critical question can not be avoided anymore.
Moreover, the Court was forced to confront claims proceeding under Flast in
the context created by Everson, which for all its sloppy historical analysis, did recognize that not every spending program that provided some benefit to religious
institutions violated the Establishment Clause. The Court’s forty-year effort to fix
principles that distinguished permissible from impermissible forms of aid to religious schools shed light on the defective holding in Flast, as shown by a brief
examination of the Court’s decisions involving tax and spend programs that provided aid to religious schools.
A good place to begin is Board of Education v. Allen,100 handed down the same
day as Flast. Allen involved a claim that a state program, which required local
school districts to lend textbooks free of charge to students regardless of whether
they attended public or private schools, violated the Establishment Clause.101 The
Court upheld the program, relying on Everson and noting that although the books
went to the pupils, the books were owned by the state, and concluding “no funds or
books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and
children, not to schools.”102 The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ effort to distinguish
Everson on the grounds that “books . . . are critical to the teaching process, and in
a sectarian school that process is employed to teach religion” by noting “religious
schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education.”103 It also
rejected the claim that “all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that the processes of secular and religious training are so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of religion.”104
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,105 the Court struck down programs providing partial
reimbursement for the cost of teachers’ salaries, as well as providing textbooks and
instructional materials in specified secular subjects on the grounds that they required
an impermissible entanglement between church and state.106 Describing the language
of the religion clauses as “at best opaque,”107 the Court reasoned that it was required
to “draw lines with reference to the three main evils against which the Establishment
100

392 U.S. 236 (1968).
Id. at 238.
102
Id. at 243–44.
103
Id. at 245.
104
Id. at 248.
105
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
106
Id. at 606–07. Rhode Island paid teachers in nonpublic schools a salary supplement of
15% of their annual salary. Id. at 607. Both programs had provisions that were designed to
ensure that the use of public funds was limited to secular (nonreligious) subjects. Id. at 608.
107
Id. at 612.
101
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Clause was intended to afford protection: ‘sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’”108
At its root, the Court held that the “substantial religious character of these
church-related schools gives rise to entangling church-state relationships of the kind
the Religion Clauses sought to avoid.”109 Focusing on the subsidy of teacher salaries,
the Court rejected analogies to the bus fare allowed in Everson or the textbooks in
Allen, and concluded that it could not “ignore the danger that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the purely
secular aspects of precollege education.”110 This risk required monitoring and, the
Court reasoned, these “prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring
entanglement between state and church.”111
Then, in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,112 the
Court presumed that programs using public funds to provide maintenance and repair
grants to private schools and tax assistance to parents (not schools) would be used
to advance religion based on the sectarian nature of the schools.113 Although the act
was premised on the important role these schools played in educating citizens, the
plaintiffs argued that “because of the substantially religious character of the intended
beneficiaries” (characterized as the schools, not the families receiving the tax assistance), the laws violated the Establishment Clause.114 Citing Madison’s Memorial
108

Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
Id. at 616. For the role that Lemon played in creating the presumption that religious
schools were pervasively sectarian and the deeply problematic nature of the presumption, see
Gerard V. Bradley, An Unconstitutional Stereotype: Catholic Schools as “Pervasively Sectarian,” 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1 (2002).
110
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617.
111
Id. at 619. The Court recognized the auditing procedure authorized under the Rhode
Island law could insert government into inspection and evaluation of the religious content
of a religious organization. Id. at 620. In the same vein, the Court emphasized that the
Pennsylvania statute also provided direct financial aid to the religious schools—not in-kind
aid of the sort previously allowed—and concluded that the auditing designed to prevent
misuse of public funds would result in excessive entanglement. Id. at 621–22. The Court also
grounded its holding on the political divisiveness it attributed to such programs, id. at 622,
but such claims do not merit detailed analysis because this is not a legal ground, and it has
been disregarded over time.
112
413 U.S. 756 (1973).
113
Id. The Court addressed a challenge to three provisions of a New York statute providing aid that benefitted religious schools. Id. at 761–62. The first element of the program
provided grants for maintenance and repair of school facilities educating low-income families with the amount of the grant calculated on a per-student basis and capped at 50% of the
per student maintenance costs at public schools. Id. at 762–63. The second provided tuition
reimbursement to low-income parents with children attending nonpublic schools in amounts
between fifty ($50) and one hundred dollars ($100), and capped at no more than 50% of
actual tuition costs. Id. at 764. The third provided a tax benefit to parents whose children
attended nonpublic schools. Id. at 765.
114
See id. at 768.
109
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and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments yet again, the Court struck down
all three provisions.115 The Court struck down the maintenance grants on the grounds
that the money presumptively subsidized religious activity taking place in the building because it was not explicitly limited to maintenance of areas where exclusively
secular activity took place.116 And it struck down tuition reimbursements to parents
sending children to religious schools on the theory that these measures must be presumed to be aid to religion because the benefits made it easier for parents to send
children to religious schools.117
Nyquist is noteworthy for the Court’s rejection of arguments designed to show
that there was no meaningful connection between the spending program and religious activity. The Court rejected the argument that the amount of the tuition reimbursement given to parents was so marginal that it did not even cover the costs of
instruction in secular subjects, never mind paying for religious activity that took
place in the school—even if the aid to parents was seen as aid to schools.118 And it
struck down tax benefits extended to parents on the grounds that “[i]n both instances
the money involved represents a charge made upon the state for the purpose of
religious education,” reasoning that “assistance to parents who send their children
to sectarian schools” had the “inevitable effect” of “aid[ing] and advanc[ing] those
religious institutions.”119
115

Id. at 760.
Id. at 774, 777–80 (rejecting argument that given the limitations on the amount of reimbursements, there would be no money left over after secular upkeep costs to spend on inherently religious activity). The Court had rejected the idea that the maintenance and repair
grants should be seen as supporting maintenance of those portions of the facilities where
instruction in secular subjects took place, emphasizing “[n]o attempt is made to restrict
payments to . . . expenditures related to . . . facilities used exclusively for secular purposes,”
and concluding that “[a]bsent appropriate restrictions . . . it . . . cannot be denied that this
section has a primary effect that advances religion in that it subsidizes directly the religious
activities of sectarian . . . schools.” Id. at 774.
117
Id. at 780–83. To the Court, the tuition grant had to be seen as coerced support for religious instruction. Finding that the effect of the aid was to ensure that parents “ha[d] the option
to send their children to religion-oriented schools,” and analogizing such support to the Virginia
General Assessment to support “Teachers of the Christian Religion,” id. at 783, 784 n.39, the
Court rejected the argument that there was no proof that public funds used to reimburse parents
who paid tuition were actually transferred to religious schools (because parents had already
paid the tuition) on the ground that the effect of the grant was to offer an “incentive to parents
to send their children to sectarian schools,” id. at 786.
118
Id. at 787.
119
Id. at 791–93 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 675 (S.D.
N.Y. 1972) (Hays, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). And in a companion case,
Levitt, the Court struck down a state law reimbursing schools for certain costs of testing and
record-keeping because the tests were prepared in-house and “no attempt is made under the
statute, and no means are available, to assure that internally prepared tests are free of religious
instruction.” Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973).
116
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Nyquist shows that the practical result of the presumption that the Court began
to employ when evaluating whether programs providing some benefit to religious
schools used public funds to support religion was to put defendants in a situation
where they had to try to prove themselves out of Establishment Clause claims by
demonstrating there was no meaningful connection between the use of public funds
and religious activity. The Court’s rejection of such arguments in Nyquist presaged
the tack it would take for the next ten to fifteen years.
In Meek v. Pittenger,120 the Court addressed and upheld a loan of secular textbooks based on Allen. But the Court struck down the direct loan of secular instructional materials under the effect prong by presuming that the secular materials would
be used to advance religion.121 Then two years later, in Wolman v. Walter,122 a Court
that was plainly divided seemed to begin backing away from the notion that secular
aid must be presumed to support religious activity taking place in the school.123 A
clear majority approved the aid that was plainly secular and could be regarded as
divertible to some religious purpose only by the most far-fetched assumptions.124
But a majority of the Court struck down provisions lending instructional materials
to families and funding for field trips on the theory that such aid had to be seen as
120

421 U.S. 349 (1975).
Id. at 365–66. The Court reasoned that “it would simply ignore reality to attempt to
separate secular educational functions from the predominantly religious role,” and when aid
“flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its
functions are subsumed in the religious mission, state aid has the impermissible effect of
advancing religion.” Id. (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also struck down the provision providing secular auxiliary
services, although rendered by public employees, relying on Lemon for its conclusion that
the “potential for impermissible fostering of religion is present,” while the monitoring
required to prevent it would lead to excessive entanglement. Id. at 369 (citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
122
433 U.S. 229 (1977).
123
Id. “In broad outline, the statute authorizes the State to provide nonpublic school pupils
with [1] books, [2] instructional materials and equipment, [3] standardized testing and scoring,
[4] diagnostic services, [5] therapeutic services, and [6] field trip transportation.” Id. at 233.
124
Id. at 236–48. Textbook loans were permissible in that “[t]his system for the loan of
textbooks to individual students bears a striking resemblance to the systems approved in Board
of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), and in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).” Id.
at 237–48. Testing provisions were constitutional since “the State provides both the schools
and the school district with the means of ensuring that minimum standards are met. . . . This
serves to prevent the use of the test as a part of religious teaching, and thus avoids that kind
of direct aid to religion found present in Levitt.” Id. at 240. For diagnostic aid, the Court
found its “decisions contain a common thread to the effect that the provision of health services to all schoolchildren—public and nonpublic—does not have the primary effect of
aiding religion.” Id. at 242. Therapy services were permissible in that “[t]he influence on a
therapist’s behavior that is exerted by the fact that he serves a sectarian pupil is qualitatively
different from the influence of the pervasive atmosphere of a religious institution.” Id. at 247.
121
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advancing the religious mission of the schools because teachers could use it in
connection with religious indoctrination.125
In School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball126 and Aguilar v. Felton,127
the notion that programs must be presumed to advance religion when aid was provided to pervasively sectarian institutions reached its zenith. In Grand Rapids, the
Court struck down a program providing instruction in secular subjects given by public employees in classrooms in nonpublic schools grounding its conclusion that the
aid advanced religion on the pervasively sectarian nature of the schools where the
aid was delivered.128 The Court disregarded findings that there was no evidence of
any religious indoctrination by the public employees on the grounds that this was
not dispositive.129 And it rejected the claim that the instruction provided by public
employees was secular, and therefore permissible, on the grounds that to allow this
practice “would be to permit ever larger segments of the religious school curriculum
to be turned over to the public school system, thus violating the cardinal principle
that the State may not in effect become the prime supporter of the religious school
system.”130 In Aguilar, a companion case, the Court struck down a program where
public employees delivered remedial instruction to students in religious schools,
even though it featured monitoring provisions designed to prevent any illicit religious activity by public employees, relying on Lemon once again to conclude that

125

Id. at 248–55. Relying on Meek, the Court held that the result of providing instructional
material to parents of students attending religious schools was prohibited because, “[s]ubstantial
aid to the educational function of such schools . . . necessarily results in aid to the sectarian
school.” Id. at 250 (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975)). Here, as in Nyquist,
the Court rejected the argument that the aid was to parents (not the schools themselves), reasoning that because the religious schools plainly benefitted, allowing the aid on the grounds
that it went to parents would exalt form over substance. Id. In the same way, it struck down
aid to field trips on the theory that they were “an integral part of the educational experience,
and where the teacher works within and for a sectarian institution, an unacceptable risk of
fostering of religion is an inevitable byproduct.” Id. at 254.
126
473 U.S. 373 (1985).
127
473 U.S. 402 (1985).
128
Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 375, 379. The opinion directly quotes the district court,
which found “without hesitation” that the schools are “pervasively sectarian . . . that the purposes of these schools is to advance their particular religions,” and that “a substantial portion
of their functions are subsumed in the religious mission.” Id. at 379 (quoting Am. United for
Separation of Church & State v. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids, 546 F. Supp. 1084, 1096 (W.D.
Mich. 1982)). It gave three reasons for its holding: (1) teachers might “become involved in
intentionally or inadvertently inculcating particular religious tenets or beliefs”; (2) the programs created a “symbolic link between government and religion”; and (3) the programs had
the effect of “providing a subsidy to the primary religious mission of the institutions affected.”
Id. at 385.
129
Id. at 388.
130
Id. at 395–97 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624–25 (1971)).
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the monitoring scheme designed to ensure the public aid was not used for religious
indoctrination created risk of an excessive entanglement between church and state.131
By now the Court’s troubled efforts to articulate a set of principles governing
when a use of public funds providing some benefit to religious schools violated the
Establishment Clause had attracted widespread criticism.132 In Agostini, the Court
identified and rejected some of the presumptions that had been used to justify decisions striking down programs providing secular aid to students in religious schools
on the theory such programs used public funds to advance religion.133 The Court
131

Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985).
See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (“Substantial revision of our
Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order . . . .”); Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 421 (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (expressing doubts about the entanglement analysis); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 109 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“One of the difficulties with the entanglement prong is that . . . it creates an ‘insoluable paradox’ in school aid cases: we have required
aid to parochial schools to be closely watched lest it be put to sectarian use, yet this close
supervision itself will create an entanglement.”); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard
W. Garnett, School Choice, the First Amendment, and Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
301, 318–26 (2000) (discussing the progression of law from Everson to Agostini as it relates
to the dichotomy of public involvement with private choice of schools); Michael A. Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 330–31 (1986) (“The Court’s sporadic
retreat to the Lemon test probably reflects the intuition that there is something basically ‘right’
about the analytic tools of each prong—‘purpose,’ ‘effect,’ and ‘entanglement’—of the test.
The Court’s recurrent drift away from Lemon doubtlessly reflects the belief that there is something dreadfully ‘wrong’ with the way that test is presently packaged.”); Gary J. Simson, The
Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court’s Approach, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 905, 908 (1987). Professor Simson suggests revisions to Lemon and other Establishment
Clause jurisprudence to a more objective analysis because, “failure to minimize the extent to
which judges are left to intuition in applying the test is apt to undermine the protective functions of the clause. Very simply, the promotion of religion is something that most people—
judges included—have difficulty seeing as bad.” Simson, supra, at 908.
133
The Court rejected three critical assumptions undergirding its decisions in Ball and
Aguilar. Id. at 222–35. It rejected the idea that the placement of public employees in religious schools engendered illicit inculcation of religion by the state because intervening case
law had rejected the idea that “solely because of her presence on private school property, a
public employee will be presumed to inculcate religion.” Id. at 224 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (holding that the public school district could provide
a sign language interpreter to a deaf student in a parochial school as part of a federal program
providing aid to the disabled)). In effect, Zobrest and Witters had rejected the presumption
so heavily relied upon in Lemon, Nyquist, and Aquilar, where the Court had said it was not
assuming that public school teachers would do the wrong thing—but had in effect presumed
that they would do so unintentionally by striking down the aid based on this supposed risk.
It rejected the idea that the presence of public employees in religious schools would create
a symbolic union between church and state, observing that the same aid could be provided
in the parking lot of religious schools while prior cases had concluded that “[t]o draw this
132
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held that public aid would be deemed to have the effect of advancing religion only
if it: (1) “result[ed] in governmental indoctrination” of religion; (2) “define[d] its
recipients by reference to religion”; or (3) “creat[ed] an excessive entanglement”
with religion.134 Applying its newly refined criteria for evaluating whether government programs beneficial to religious schools had the primary effect of advancing
religion, the Court concluded that the aid at issue in Agostini (sending public school
teachers into parochial school classrooms to provide remedial instruction) passed
muster under the Establishment Clause.135
Mitchell v. Helms represents the Court’s most recent effort to address spending
programs providing some arguable benefit to religious schools and shows a Court
still divided when wrestling with the troubled legacy of Flast.136 In Mitchell, the
Court addressed a challenge to application of the ESEA’s provisions allowing public
funds to be used to purchase secular educational materials and equipment (for example library and media materials, computer hardware and software), allocated for
use in public and private schools based on student enrollment, the very spending that
had provoked the decision in Flast.137 Relying heavily on Meek and Wolman, the
challengers argued that the provisions at issue violated the Establishment Clause
because it constituted “direct, nonincidental aid” to religious schools that could be
(and had been) diverted to religious uses.138
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, relied on the neutrality and
private choice factors to reason that where aid was allocated based on religionneutral criteria and directed as a result of individual choice, any benefit to religion arising from the aid program could not be attributed to the government.139 By
line based solely on the location of the public employee is neither ‘sensible’ nor ‘sound.’”
Id. at 225–28. And it rejected the idea that “placing full-time public employees on parochial
campuses to provide [secular] instruction would impermissibly finance religious indoctrination,” finding “most fatal to the argument . . . that it applies with equal force when those services are provided off campus,” an argument Aquilar had implicitly rejected. Id. at 228, 230.
134
Id. at 234.
135
Id. at 234–35.
136
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
137
Compare id. at 801–03 (plurality opinion), with Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85–88
(1968).
138
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139
Citing Agostini, the plurality reasoned that whether funding violated the Establishment
Clause depended ultimately on whether any resulting benefit to religion could be attributed to
the government, and further, that the resolution of this question determined whether government aid “subsidized” religion in a manner prohibited by the Establishment Clause. Id. at 809
(citing Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10; Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 488–89 (1986)). Next, the plurality found that when government extended secular aid on
a neutral basis, there was no basis for a claim that government aid supported religious indoctrination. Id. at 809–13. And here the plurality emphasized that the Court had consistently
treated evidence that a program allocated aid according to genuine private choice as strong
indicia of neutrality while at the same time rejecting claims that aid programs violated the
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the same token, so long as the aid provided by the government did not have religious content, any use of the aid for a religious purpose could not be attributed to
government.140 Here the plurality took pains to reject the claim that the aid was unconstitutional simply because it freed resources for religious uses.141 And it went out
of its way to reject the idea that the constitutionality of government programs providing some benefit to religious entities turned on whether these were deemed
“pervasively sectarian,” reasoning that “the religious nature of a recipient should not
matter to the constitutional analysis, so long as the recipient adequately furthers the
government’s secular purpose.”142 For these reasons, the plurality found the aid
program did not violate the Establishment Clause as applied to religious schools and
overruled Meek and Wolman to the extent they were inconsistent with the holding.143
Establishment Clause merely because it had the effect of reducing some of the costs of
education in religious schools. Id.
140
Id. at 820. The plurality then connected Allen with subsequent cases where the Court
had rejected claims that secular aid advanced religion in violation of the Establishment Clause
by relying on neutrality and private choice, concluding that the “issue is not divertibility of aid
but rather whether the aid itself has an impermissible content.” Id. at 819–23 (citing Zobrest,
509 U.S. at 18 (permitting public school district’s sign language interpreter in a parochial
school despite serving as a potential medium for religious teaching to deaf student); Witters
v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486–87 (1986) (permitting funding of vocational education for students attending sectarian schools due to the principle of
neutrality and decisions that are unattributed to government policy); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 391 n.2 (1983) (allowing financial assistance to sectarian institutions through tax
deductions for expenses incurred in sending their children to parochial schools without segregation to secular subjects); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968) (permitting aid
so long as it is not “unsuitable for use in the public schools because of religious content”)).
Later the plurality in Mitchell buttressed this point by noting that there was ample evidence
that some of the equipment (for example projectors or computers) had been used to convey
religious content, but finding such diversion immaterial because it is not attributable to the
government. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820, 833–34 & n.17.
141
Id. at 824–25. The Court noted, with a hint of irony (or maybe tongue-in-cheek), that
it was “perhaps conceivable that courts could take upon themselves the task of distinguishing
among the myriad kinds of possible aid based on the ease of diverting each kind. But it
escapes us how a court might coherently draw any such line.” Id. at 825.
142
Id. at 827.
143
Id. at 829. The Court found no government-sponsored religious indoctrination because
any religious activity that could be associated with the aid was not attributable to the government given that the aid was allocated on religiously neutral criteria and flowed according to
genuine private choice. Id. at 829–31. In addition, the aid did not have religious content and
consequently it could not be seen as violating the effects prong as interpreted in Agostini. Id.
at 831. Here the plurality mustered opinions demonstrating that neither of the cases could be
squared with the main weight of the Court’s holdings, including Everson and Allen, which
had allowed programs providing similar benefits to religious schools. Id. at 835–36. And it
reasoned that Agostini had effectively rejected the reasoning in Meek and Wolman when it
rejected the presumption undergirding Aguilar. Id. at 836.
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Justices O’Connor and Breyer concurred in the judgment resolving the case on
narrower grounds based on the refined effects test laid down in Agostini and the factual similarity between those cases.144 Of particular significance here is their rejection
of Meek and Wolman as creating “two irreconcilable strands of our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence,” one, represented by Meek and Wolman, that presumed divertibility of public aid to religious uses, and the other, represented by Allen, which refused
to presume diversion.145 They chose the rule applied in Allen with the consequence
144

The refined effects test found that the government did not define recipients based on
religious criteria. Id. at 845–46 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In addition, the program did not
result in government indoctrination for a number of interrelated reasons; it used federal funds
to purchase secular materials loaned to religious schools in a manner designed to supplement,
not supplant, funding from other sources, with protections designed to prevent the diversion
of the aid to religious uses; and “no [government] funds ever reach[ed] the coffers of religious schools.” Id. at 846–49, 867. The concurring Justices rejected the plurality’s view that
government aid to religious schools did “not have the effect of advancing religion so long
as the aid is offered on a neutral basis and the aid is secular in content.” Id. at 837. While acknowledging that neutrality was an important indicator that government programs distributing
secular aid did not have the impermissible effect of advancing religion, the concurrence maintained that neutrality could not be viewed as dispositive. Id. at 839–40. They also rejected
the plurality’s equation of direct and indirect aid, reasoning that the unique risks of divertibility presented by “direct aid,” particularly direct aid in the form of public funds, justified
treating programs where the government provided aid directly to religious institutions, even on
a per-capita basis, differently from programs where aid was directed based on “true privatechoice” (for example vouchers used by private individuals). Id. at 840–44. Here the concurrence
offered a distinction between “per-capita-aid” programs, where the government transfers aid
directly to the religious school, even when allocated according to private choices (e.g., attendance) as opposed to what it called “true private-choice” programs (apparently meaning programs where the government directs or assigns aid to the individual recipient who can then
use the aid, even if the use confers some benefit on a religious entity). Id. at 842.
145
The plurality addressed the challengers’ two principal arguments. See id. at 814
(plurality opinion) (noting the challengers arguments that the Establishment Clause barred
“direct, nonincidental aid” to religious schools and that the provision to religious schools of
aid that is divertible to religious uses is barred by the Establishment Clause). The
concurrence rejected the argument that Meek and Wolman required invalidation of programs
providing aid in the form of instructional material. Id. at 849–52 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Referring to Allen, the concurrence noted that “[a]t the time they were decided, Meek and
Wolman created an inexplicable rift within our Establishment Clause jurisprudence
concerning government aid to schools.” Id. at 849 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 238 (1968)). The concurrence explained by contrasting Meek and Wolman with Allen,
and pointing out that “while the Court was willing to apply an irrebuttable presumption that
secular instructional materials and equipment would be diverted to use for religious
indoctrination [in Meek and Wolman], it required evidence that religious schools were
diverting secular textbooks to religious instruction [in Allen].” Id. at 851. Emphasizing that
the “inconsistency between the two strands of the Court’s jurisprudence did not go unnoticed,”
the concurring Justices concluded that the distinction made between aid in the form of textbooks and other instructional materials was irrational. Id. at 851–52.
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that in order “[t]o establish a First Amendment violation, plaintiffs must prove that
the aid in question actually is, or has been, used for religious purposes.”146
Two points stand out from the Court’s thirty-year effort to resolve the merits of
cases advanced under Flast. The first is that the Court ultimately rejected the presumptions it had created to justify decisions holding that programs providing some
aid or benefit to religious entities performing secular services violated the Establishment Clause. As explained further below, these presumptions served as gap-fillers
that remedied the lack of taxpayer injury needed to support standing in the first
place. The Court’s rejection of these presumptions invites renewed attention to the
injury said to support standing.
The second point is that the Court ended up with a test that required plaintiffs
to demonstrate that public aid had actually been used to advance religion. Here too,
the Court’s renewed focus on the actual use of aid provided with public funds emphasizes the need to demonstrate taxpayer injury to support standing in the first place.
There is good reason to believe that the Court’s more recent decisions will yield
a stable set of principles that can be used to evaluate challenges to public programs
advanced under the Establishment Clause. But the larger question is why federal
courts ever decided these cases in the first place. Before turning to that question it
is necessary to briefly examine the Court’s efforts to deal with Flast’s standing test.
III.
The Court dealt with taxpayer standing in a handful of cases from Flast to Winn
that provide the foundation for the reform of Flast.147 Flast purported to create an
exception to the general bar on taxpayer standing laid down in Frothingham on the
grounds that the Establishment Clause was designed to protect taxpayers from a
specific and very personal injury–a use of the tax and spend power to coerce support
for religion.148 For this reason, the Establishment Clause was understood to create
146

Justices O’Connor and Breyer agreed with the plurality that Agostini had undermined
the presumption undergirding Meek and Wolman and joined the plurality to overrule those
decisions. Id. at 857. The concurring Justices rejected the argument that the actual use of
some of the materials in connection with religious instruction was a diversion of aid to a
religious use that required the program to be struck down on the grounds that the evidence
of actual diversion was de minimis and could not justify such a drastic remedy. Id. at 860–67.
147
Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011); Hein v. Freedom
From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332
(2006); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Together these cases
develop a discussion between the variety of interests that have weighed against any exception
to Frothingham’s bar on taxpayer standing beyond that of Congress’s Article I, § 8 taxing
and spending powers limited by the Establishment Clause.
148
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102–06 (1968) (“We have noted that the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment does specifically limit the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8. . . . Consequently, we hold that a taxpayer will have standing consistent
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a specific restraint on the tax and spend power.149 And the two-pronged test promulgated in Flast was said to distinguish taxpayers advancing claims arising from this
personal injury made cognizable by the Establishment Clause from other cases
where the Court had rejected taxpayer suits as generalized grievances.150
Flast quite naturally engendered taxpayer litigation designed to test the limits
of the bar on taxpayer grievances created by Frothingham, and the Court’s response
was remarkably consistent. The Court consistently refused to find that other constitutional provisions served as a limitation on the tax and spend power and reinforced
the general bar on taxpayer standing laid down in Frothingham.151 The Court refused
to extend Flast in any way, shape, or form, limiting Flast to its role as a restraint on
a congressional exercise of its tax and spend power to appropriate funds “in aid of
religion,”152 the proposition it took Flast to stand for.153
The feature of these cases that is pertinent here is the Court’s discussion of the
taxpayer injury that justified the Flast exception to the bar on taxpayer grievances
created by Frothingham. It is the contribution these cases made to the Court’s
refined focus on the injury that justified the exception in Flast. That exception
provided the foundation for Winn and fosters an opportunity to refine the application of Flast along lines that are consistent with the original understanding of the
Establishment Clause.
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc.,154 the Court confronted a taxpayer challenge to the Department of
Health Education and Welfare’s (HEW) transfer of federal property to a Christian
with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action
under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which
operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power.”).
149
Id.
150
Id. at 104–05.
151
See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 347 (refusing to find that the Commerce Clause served as a limitation on the tax and spend power); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974) (rejecting the contention that the Incompatibility Clause operated as a specific
check on the tax and spend power that supported standing for taxpayers who argued that the
clause prohibited reservists from receiving payment while sitting as members of Congress);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174–75 (1974) (rejecting the claim that the Accounts
Clause supported standing for taxpayers challenging a statute that authorized disbursements
to the CIA without providing an accounting).
152
Cuno, 547 U.S. at 348.
153
See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 609–10 (2007) (refusing
to consider taxpayer standing against congressional appropriations to an Executive Branch
department that would grant funds to faith-based initiative groups); Cuno, 547 U.S. at 347
(refusing to extend taxpayer standing under the Commerce Clause); Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479–482
(1982) (refusing to extend taxpayer standing to challenge Executive Branch action taken
pursuant to Property Clause of Art. IV).
154
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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college at no charge to the college (because the property would be used for an educational purpose).155 The plaintiffs were allowed to proceed based on their status as
taxpayers and based on allegations that they “would be deprived of the fair and
constitutional use of his (her) tax dollars for constitutional purposes in violation of
his (her) rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,” and
sought to undo the transfer.156
The Supreme Court held that the taxpayers lacked standing.157 The Court began
by noting that Frothingham had rejected a taxpayer’s challenge to federal spending,
although premised on the claim that it would result in increased taxation, because
the relationship between the expenditure and the tax burden was remote and uncertain, and as a result, the plaintiff failed to show a direct personal injury but, instead,
“suffer[ed] in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”158 Doremus
was used to illustrate the proposition because in that case the Court had relied on
Frothingham to reject taxpayers’ challenge to religious readings in the classroom
on the ground that the plaintiffs’ grievance was “not a direct dollars-and-cents injury
but is a religious difference.”159
The Court held that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the test in Flast, essentially
because the plaintiffs challenged an Executive Branch decision, not a congressional
exercise of its tax and spend power.160 The Court acknowledged that the taxpayer
plaintiffs were deeply offended by the transfer of property to a religious institution
and believed it was unconstitutional, but held that they did not have the personal
stake needed to support standing because “[t]hey fail to identify any personal injury
suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged unconstitutional error, other than
the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with
which one disagrees.”161
155

Id. at 466–69.
Id. at 469. Americans United grounded its standing on its status as an organization with
over ninety thousand “taxpayer members,” and indeed, the Court found that standing had to
be grounded among its membership because the corporation demonstrated no distinct injury
of its own. Id. at 476–77 & n.14.
157
See generally Valley Forge, 544 U.S. 464 (1982).
158
Id. at 478 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)).
159
Id. at 478 (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court also emphasized that Flast had distinguished Frothingham
on the grounds that the plaintiff had not invoked “a specific limitation on [Congress’s] power
to tax and spend.” Id. at 479.
160
The Court gave two reasons for its holding. First, the Flast exception was a restraint on
the exercise of legislative (not executive) power, but the plaintiffs sought to challenge an executive branch decision. Id. at 479 & n.15. Second, the property transfer here was not an exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending power. Id. at 480.
161
Id. at 485 (emphasis omitted). In a footnote, the Court cited back to Schlesinger’s citation
of Doremus, stating that:
[w]e have no doubt about the sincerity of the respondents’ stated objectives and the depth of their commitment to them. But the essence of
156
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Valley Forge was significant because the plaintiffs sought to use their status as
taxpayers to bootstrap standing for their objection to a transfer of federal property
to a religious organization, an injury not made cognizable in Flast.162 The Court
refused to allow the plaintiffs to use their taxpayer status to support standing based
on an injury not connected to a use of the taxpayers’ money.163 And by the same
token it found that the injury relied on by the taxpayers was not cognizable under
Flast because the individual taxpayers could not show the personal “dollars-andcents injury” needed to support taxpayer standing.164
Valley Forge was followed by Bowen v. Kendrick,165 a taxpayer challenge to the
funding of religious organizations under the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA).166
The AFLA program provided grants to private organizations to provide secular
services, including counseling regarding premarital sex and pregnancy,167 and the
taxpayers alleged that the program violated the Establishment Clause on its face and
as-applied.168 The district court struck down the act on its face reasoning that the act
advanced religion because supporting counseling rendered by religious organizations made it “possible for religiously affiliated grantees to teach adolescents on
issues that can be considered ‘fundamental elements of religious doctrine,’” and
“[t]o presume that . . . counselors from religious organizations can put their beliefs
aside when counseling an adolescent on matters that are part of religious doctrine
is simply unrealistic.”169 The Supreme Court reversed, holding AFLA was constitutional on its face and remanding the case for consideration of the as-applied
challenge to determine whether any grants to religious organizations violated the
Establishment Clause.170
standing “is not a question of motivation but of possession of the
requisite . . . interest that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct.”
Id. at 487 n.21 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
225–26 (1974)).
162
Id. at 479–80, 482.
163
Id. at 480–81 n.17.
164
Id. at 478–80.
165
487 U.S. 589 (1988).
166
Id. at 593, 597; Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 578 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300z
et seq. (1982 & Supp. IV 1982)).
167
Id. at 597.
168
Id. at 593.
169
Id. at 598–99 (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1562–63 (D.D.C. 1987)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
170
Id. at 593. Rejecting the facial challenge, the Court held that there was no reason to
presume that religious organizations could not deliver the secular counseling that AFLA
funds were designed to support while entertaining the idea that the program would be unconstitutional if it granted those same funds for the same purpose largely to institutions that were
pervasively sectarian. Id. at 604, 608–13.
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Of interest here is the Court’s rejection of the argument that the plaintiffs had
no standing under Valley Forge because they were challenging Executive Branch
contracting decisions (not a congressional exercise of the tax and spend power), and
the dispute concerning the remand.171 Observing that Flast had involved a suit
against an executive branch official administering a spending program created by
Congress, the Court emphasized that “AFLA is at heart a program of disbursement
of funds pursuant to Congress’ taxing and spending powers, and appellees’ claims
call into question how the funds authorized by Congress are being disbursed pursuant to the AFLA’s statutory mandate.”172 For this reason, it held that there was a
“sufficient nexus between the taxpayer’s standing as a taxpayer and the congressional exercise of taxing and spending power, notwithstanding the role the Secretary
plays in administering the statute,” and distinguished Valley Forge on the grounds
that it involved an exercise of executive power under the Property Clause.173 Because the plaintiffs could show an exercise of congressional tax and spend authority
they fit within Flast, even as narrowly construed in Valley Forge.
The holding here represented an orthodox application of Flast, which had held
that the taxpayers had standing to challenge ESEA grants to religious schools just
because the resources purchased by public funds provided a benefit to religious
schools.174 Here, of course, the public monies (not materials) were being transferred
to religious institutions to implement a secular program.175 Even so, that left the
Court in Bowen with the same question so often begged in these cases: exactly how
did the use of funds inflict the taxpayer injury identified in Flast?
The Court remanded the as-applied challenge but fractured as to the principles
that should control the proceedings below.176 The Court agreed that the District
Court’s holding that AFLA aid had been given to pervasively sectarian religious
organizations was not adequately supported by the record177 and consequently relief
could not be justified on the assumption that organizations with a religious dimension could not deliver secular counseling services without inculcating religion.178
But the majority could not agree as to the use of funds that would support a
finding of liability on the remand. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor
171

Id. at 619–20.
Id.
173
Id.
174
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
175
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 597.
176
Id. at 621 (claiming that these would be an as applied violation if aid went to a “pervasively sectarian” religious organization); id. at 623–24 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing any
use of public funds in the promotion of religious doctrine violates the Establishment Clause);
id. at 624 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the Court’s standard for lower courts).
177
Id. at 620–21 (majority opinion).
178
Id. at 613, 620 (noting the services authorized by AFLA “are not themselves ‘specifically religious activities,’ and they are not converted into such activities by the fact that they
are carried out by organizations with religious affiliations”).
172
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and White, indicated that on remand the appellees should have a chance to “show
that AFLA aid is flowing to grantees that can be considered ‘pervasively sectarian’
religious institutions, such as we have held parochial schools to be,” while cautioning
that “it is not enough to show that the recipient . . . is affiliated with a religious
institution or that it is ‘religiously inspired.’”179 He also indicated that the District
Court should “consider . . . whether in particular cases AFLA aid has been used to
fund ‘specifically religious activit[ies] in an otherwise substantially secular setting.’”180
Justices Kennedy and Scalia concurred in the decision but wrote separately to
disavow the idea that relief turned on whether AFLA grantees were “pervasively
sectarian.”181 In their view, “such a showing will not alone be enough . . . to make
out a violation of the Establishment Clause.”182 They reasoned that “the only purpose of further inquiring whether any particular grantee institution is pervasively
sectarian is as a preliminary step to demonstrating that the funds are in fact being
used to further religion” because the “question in an as-applied challenge is not
whether the entity is of a religious character, but how it spends its grant.”183
In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,184 the Court rejected the idea that the
Commerce Clause served as a specific restraint on the tax and spend power that
would support taxpayer standing akin to the Establishment Clause.185 It did so on the
ground that “[w]hatever rights plaintiffs have under the Commerce Clause, they are
fundamentally unlike the right not to ‘contribute three pence . . . for the support of
any one [religious] establishment.’”186 Here, the Court emphasized that the Flast
Court had found that one of the “specific evils” the Establishment Clause was meant
to address was “that the taxing and spending power would be used to . . . support
religion.”187 It had “understood the ‘injury’ alleged . . . in challenges to federal
spending to be the very ‘extract[ion] and spend[ing]’ of ‘tax money’ in aid of
religion,”188 and it had concluded that restraint of such spending would “redress
that injury, regardless of whether lawmakers would dispose of the savings in a way
that would benefit the taxpayer . . . personally.”189 Because there was no indication
that the Commerce Clause was intended to act as a similar restraint on the taxing
power, the Court held the taxpayers had only a “generalized grievance[ ].”190
179

Id. at 621.
Id. at 621 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
181
Id. at 624–25 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
182
Id. at 624.
183
Id. at 624–25.
184
547 U.S. 332 (2006).
185
Id.
186
Id. at 347.
187
Id. at 348 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968)).
188
Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106).
189
Id. at 348–49 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 514 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
190
Id. at 348.
180
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Then in Hein,191 the Court held that Flast did not give taxpayers standing to challenge an Executive Branch initiative designed to ensure that faith-based organizations
enjoyed equal access to federal grant programs on the grounds that it violated the
Establishment Clause, albeit without a majority opinion.192 The plurality opinion,
authored by Justice Alito and joined in by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy
held that the plaintiffs’ claim was a generalized grievance barred by Frothingham,
and used Doremus as an example of a taxpayer attempting to assert the “interests of
the public at large,” because the grievance in that case was “not a direct dollars-andcents injury but . . . a religious difference.”193 The plurality distinguished Flast on
the grounds that “[t]he expenditures challenged in Flast . . . were funded by a specific congressional appropriation and were disbursed to private schools (including
religiously affiliated schools) pursuant to a direct and unambiguous congressional
mandate.”194 It distinguished Bowen because “AFLA not only expressly authorized
and appropriated specific funds for grantmaking, it also expressly contemplated that
some of these moneys might go to projects involving religious groups.”195 Finding
that the congressional appropriation to the executive branch “did not expressly
authorize, direct, or even mention the expenditures,” the plurality reasoned that the
“link between congressional action and constitutional violation that supported taxpayer standing in Flast is missing here,” and refused to extend Flast to a use of public funds that “resulted from executive discretion, not congressional action.”196
The plurality rejected the argument that distinguishing Flast on the grounds that
in Hein the Executive Branch had spent money without congressional approval was
arbitrary because the injury to the taxpayer was the same.197 Here, it emphasized that
Flast itself had rested on a distinction between congressional appropriations and
191

Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
Id. at 592–95. The plaintiffs alleged that the program violated the Establishment Clause
because it advanced religion, grounding their standing on their status as “federal taxpayers . . .
opposed to the use of Congressional . . . appropriations to advance and promote religion.” Id.
at 595–96 (quoting Amended Complaint at ¶ 10, Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao
(W.D. Wisc. Sept. 6, 2007) (No. 04 C 0381S).
193
Id. at 600–01 (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952)).
194
Id. at 604. By way of support for this assertion, the plurality noted that “[a]t around the
time the [ESEA] was passed and Flast was decided, the great majority of nonpublic elementary and secondary schools . . . were associated with a church,” and consequently “Congress
surely understood that much of the aid mandated by the statute would find its way to religious schools.” Id. at 604 n.3. I realize this reading of Flast can be questioned, but the important point here is to understand how the Court is reading Flast.
195
Id. at 606–07 (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 595–96 (1988)). The plurality
rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on Bowen “for the simple reason that they can cite no statute
whose application they challenge. The best they can do is to point to unspecified, lump-sum
‘Congressional budget appropriations’ for the general use of the Executive Branch.” Id.
196
Id. at 605.
197
Id. at 609.
192

1140

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:1107

merely incidental expenditures (the grounds used to distinguish Doremus), and
refused to extend Flast to the Executive Branch on the grounds that this would raise
serious separation of powers concerns that Flast had failed to value properly.198
The Court was plainly divided. Justice Kennedy joined the plurality opinion,199
but wrote separately to affirm Flast while emphasizing the separation of powers
concerns that justified the refusal to extend taxpayer standing to discretionary spending by the Executive Branch.200 Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment, but offered a scathing critique of the plurality opinion, arguing that there was
no principled way to distinguish the harm at issue in Hein from the injury alleged
in Flast and calling for the overruling of Flast as inconsistent with Article III limitations on judicial power.201 For their part, the dissenters rejected the distinction between Legislative Branch and Executive Branch expenditures as supported by
neither logic nor precedent.202 Such was the unhappy state of Flast when the Court
took up Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn.203
In Winn, the Court took up a question it had passed over in Cuno and addressed
the kind of use of the taxing power that might violate the Establishment Clause.204 In
that case state taxpayers argued that tax credits extended to state taxpayers for contributions to school tuition organizations (STOs) providing scholarships to religious
schools advanced religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.205 The taxpayer
plaintiffs argued that the law allowed STOs “to use State income-tax revenues to pay
tuition for students at religious schools, some of which [would] discriminate on the
basis of religion.”206 The Court granted certiorari and dismissed the claim for lack
198

Id. at 609–10 (“Flast itself distinguished the incidental expenditure of tax funds in the
administration of an essentially regulatory statute . . . .” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 102 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Citing the potentially far-reaching implications such an extension of Flast would have in terms of judicial oversight of Executive
Branch activities, the Court indicated the argument would raise serious separation of powers
concerns that Flast itself had weighed too lightly. Id. at 611. For further discussion on the
connection between standing and separation of powers, see Jonathan H. Adler, God, Gaia, the
Taxpayer, and the Lorax: Standing, Justiciability, and Separation of Powers after Massachusetts
and Hein, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 175, 198 (2007–2008) (“[E]xcessive judicial involvement could
threaten the vitality of separation of powers and can undermine the vitality of self-government.”).
199
Id. at 588.
200
Hein, 551 U.S. at 615–18 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
201
Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring).
202
Id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting).
203
131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
204
Compare id. at 1447, with DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347 (2006)
(observing that “[q]uite apart from whether the franchise tax credit is analogous to an exercise of congressional power under Article I, § 8, plaintiffs’ reliance on Flast is misguided”).
205
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1440.
206
Id. at 1441 (quoting Complaint at ¶¶ 29–31, Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v.
Winn, 361 F. Supp.2d 1117 (D. Ariz. 2005) (No. CIV. 00-0287-PHXEHC)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of taxpayer standing holding that the taxpayer claim did not fit within Flast and
therefore was a generalized grievance barred by the rule in Frothingham.207
The Court began by noting that in Flast the two-pronged test had been “deemed
satisfied . . . based on the allegation that Government funds had been spent on an
outlay for religion in contravention of the Establishment Clause.”208 Here, it emphasized that Flast “understood the ‘injury’ . . . to be the very ‘extract[ion] and
spen[ding]’ of ‘tax money’ in aid of religion alleged by a plaintiff,”209 and that
“‘[s]uch an injury’ . . . is unlike ‘generalized grievances about the conduct of government’ and so is ‘appropriate for judicial redress.’”210 The Court relied once again
on Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance as epitomizing the harm the Establishment Clause was meant to prevent, that is, the use of the taxing and spending power
to take an individual’s money and apply it to support religion.211
With this framework in mind, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ effort to secure
taxpayer standing on the grounds that “the tax credit is, for Flast purposes, best
understood as a governmental expenditure.”212 The Court emphasized that “[a] dissenter whose tax dollars are ‘extracted and spent’ knows that he has in some small
measure been made to contribute to an establishment in violation of conscience,”
while the tax credit given to those who contributed to STOs did “not ‘extrac[t] and
spen[d]’ a conscientious dissenter’s funds in service of an establishment.”213 And
from this it followed that the plaintiffs could not establish causation and redressability; the tax credit program did not cause an improper spending of the taxpayers’
money to support religion, and by the same token, enjoining the tax credit program
would not halt a use of the taxpayer’s funds deemed improper under Flast.214
Taken together these cases show the result of the Court’s ongoing effort to
define the taxpayer injury needed to support standing under Flast. The Court has
insisted that the injury must be caused by a congressional exercise of the taxing and
spending power, not executive or (presumably) judicial action.215 And here the Court
207

Id. at 1440–41. Emphasizing the separation of powers concerns underlying the bar on
taxpayer standing, the Court stated that “claims of taxpayer standing rest on unjustifiable
economic and political speculation” as support for its holding that the taxpayers’ challenge
to the tax credit was barred for the same reasons that barred any taxpayer suit, and that
plaintiff’s argument did not fit within the Flast exception. Id. at 1441–47 (citing Cuno, 547
U.S. at 344).
208
Id. at 1445 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85–86 (1968)).
209
Id. at 1446 (quoting Cuno, 547 U.S. at 348).
210
Id. at 1446 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106).
211
Id. at 1446 (“In Madison’s view, government should not ‘force a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment.’” (quoting Flast,
392 U.S. at 103)).
212
Id. at 1447.
213
Id. at 1447 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106).
214
Id. at 1447–48.
215
See id. at 1445 (noting that courts require that taxpayers can only challenge a statute
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has insisted that Congress specifically authorized the appropriation said to violate
the Establishment Clause in Bowen and Hein.216 In Valley Forge, the Court made it
plain that taxpayers had to point to an identifiable expenditure of public funds in
order to proceed under Flast.217
Other cases have focused more on the use of the taxing power. Cuno and Winn
shed light on the specific use of the taxing power needed to support standing. In
Cuno, the Court’s scrutiny of Flast lead it to emphasize that the taxpayer injury
made cognizable in Flast was a use of the tax power to extract money from an
individual that later is used to support religion.218 In Winn, the Court rejected a
taxpayer’s challenge to a use of the tax power that did not involve such an extraction
and spending of taxpayer money to finance religion.219
Winn is the fruit of the Court’s painstaking efforts to make sense of Flast while
it has struggled to address cases entering the federal courts under Flast’s twopronged test.220 The Court’s efforts have yielded a rigorous analysis of the precise
injury described in the Flast decision, and therefore, the precise use of the tax and
spend power that is properly restrained. The Court can engage in a meaningful reform of Flast if it employs the same rigor when it evaluates the precise use of the
spending power that inflicts the personal injury (thereby creating the personal stake
needed to support taxpayer standing under Flast).

under the Establishment Clause if “the allegation was that the Federal Government violated
the . . . Clause in the exercise of its legislative authority both to collect and spend tax
dollars”). The Winn Court cited both Hein and Valley Forge. Id.
216
See id. at 1445.
217
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 479 (1982).
218
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006).
219
Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1437 (2011).
220
These painstaking efforts have prompted praise and criticism in scholarship written in
the short span of time since the decision. Some have viewed the Winn decision as shortchanging the analysis needed in standing and Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Marshall &
Nichol, supra note 8, at 251–52. Others have viewed the Winn decision as aptly focusing more
closely on the precise harm caused by the alleged constitutional violation. Tim Keller, Arizona
Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn: Does the Government Own the Money in Your
Pocket?, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 149, 182 (noting that there was no harm because Arizona
taxpayers were spending “their own money,” not other taxpayers’ money). The discussion criticizing the decision appears focused on the alleged need to broaden standing doctrines to allow
obviously constitutional “psychic harm” injuries rather than focusing closely on the Article III
requirements of insuring that proper plaintiffs are proceeding in the action and that the injury
alleged meets Flast’s test. Compare Marshall & Nichol, supra note 8, at 252 (“Failing to grant
standing to those asserting these [psychic harm] injuries means core Establishment Clause guarantees will be violated without judicial redress.”), with Keller, supra, at 181–82 (“The plaintiffs in ACSTO could not show a particular injury because the tax credits at issue did not extract
and spend the plaintiffs’ money.”).
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IV.
Flast continues to provoke controversy more than forty years after it was decided and therefore continues to demand our attention.221 Courts and commentators
continue to look for a solution.222 Must Flast be overruled or can it be refined so as
to improve on the defects that prompt criticism without disregarding the parts of the
decision that seem to account for its resilience? I believe the answer to these questions can be found by looking at Flast in the context provided here.
In fashioning the exception to the bar on taxpayer grievances erected in Frothingham, the Court in Flast was able to make a persuasive showing that the Establishment Clause was meant to prohibit the use of civil law to compel financial
support for religion.223 The core element of Flast was an individual liberty interest
protected by the Establishment Clause.224
Flast showed that using the taxing and spending power to take a citizen’s money
to support religion was understood to violate the right to religious liberty that the
First Amendment was designed to protect.225 And it demonstrated the connection
between that individual liberty interest and one’s status as a taxpayer which, in turn,
supported the claim that the Establishment Clause was understood to impose a
restraint on the tax and spend power.226 By identifying the specific use of public
funds which violated the religious liberty protected by the First Amendment, the
Court could make a persuasive showing that the taxpayer whose funds were taken
to support religion had a concrete and personal “injury-in-fact” that was properly
cognizable under the Establishment Clause.227
In addition, the two-pronged test fashioned in Flast does serve to distinguish
taxpayer grievances advanced under the Establishment Clause from other taxpayer
grievances in a meaningful way. The test allowed the Court to anchor the exception
created in Flast to the connection it demonstrated between taxpayer status and the
individual religious liberty interest protected by the Establishment Clause. In this
way, the test allowed the Court to create an exception to the general bar on taxpayer
standing erected in Frothingham without undermining, in principle, the important
role the Court’s standing doctrine plays in promoting the separation of powers.
Flast endures for these reasons. Its core premise, that is, that the Establishment
Clause was meant to prohibit the use of the tax and spend power to compel support
221

See, e.g., Edward R. Shaoul, Comment, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization
v. Winn: Reconsidering Flast’s Exception to the Rule Against Taxpayer Standing and Establishing the Tax Credit Distinction, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 305 (2011).
222
See id.
223
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1968).
224
See generally Flast, 392 U.S. 83.
225
Id. at 104–06.
226
Id. at 105–06.
227
Id. at 87, 103.
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for religion because this infringed on a personal right to religious liberty, is historically defensible and continues to command respect.228 The two-pronged test—for
all its defects—does serve to differentiate the Establishment Clause from other provisions as a specific restraint on the tax and spend power.
Flast remains controversial—and reform is necessary—because its actual holding
is deeply flawed. The Flast Court found standing even though the taxpayers had not
demonstrated the personal injury the Court had used to justify the exception it created
to Frothingham’s bar on taxpayer grievances.229 In doing so, it utterly disregarded
the historical understanding of the Establishment Clause. The historical record that
the Court relied on to justify the exception in Flast supports the view that the Clause
operated as a limitation on the tax and spend power to protect individuals from being
coerced into supporting inherently religious activities.230 But the historical record
also shows that spending measures which involved outright payments to religious
institutions providing secular services were not understood to violate the religious
liberty provisions.231
This original understanding of the comparatively limited scope of the restraint
on the tax and spend power created by the Establishment Clause was not based on
any failure to appreciate that spending programs which transferred public funds to
religious institutions performing secular services were beneficial to religious institutions. Quite the contrary, the controversy that sparked the Blaine Amendment and
others like it proceeded from a recognition of, and objection to, such programs for
this very reason.232 But the fundamental point is that the movement to amend the
federal and state constitutions to prohibit such practices conclusively demonstrates
a consensus that this practice did not violate the original religious liberty provisions
of the federal or state constitutions.233
The history of the original religious liberty provisions and the Blaine Amendments show that the use of public funds to support religious institutions providing
secular social services was understood to be different from the use of public funds
to support inherently religious activity.234 Put in terms of the personal injury to a
228

Id. at 104–06; Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1445–47
(2011).
229
See Flast, 392 U.S. at 88, 102.
230
See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 (Hunt ed., 1901) [hereinafter Memorial and
Remonstrance].
231
See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (holding that contracting with a religiously affiliated hospital did not amount to an unconstitutional establishment of religion).
232
See HAMBURGER, supra note 27, at 298–300 (discussing the Blaine movement and an
1876 draft for a proposed amendment that would strengthen the separation of church and
state in light of the inadequacies of the First Amendment).
233
Id. at 298–301.
234
See, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 31, at 155–57 (outlining the original rationale that Blaine
wrote in his letter to Congress advocating for the amendment).
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religious liberty interest, the distinction can be framed as follows. The use of public
funds to finance inherently religious activities was understood to violate the right
to religious liberty protected by those same religious liberty provisions. In contrast,
the use of public funds to finance the provision of secular services by private
entities, including religious entities, was understood to finance the secular activity
and therefore was quite sensibly not taken to violate the personal right to religious
liberty guaranteed by the original liberty provisions.
By chance or design, the holding in Flast involved a sleight of hand. It justified
the exception to the bar on taxpayer standing with reference to a particular taxpayer
injury, the use of public funds to support inherently religious activity. But the Court
held the plaintiffs had standing in Flast without showing any such a misuse of
public funds. Instead of requiring the plaintiffs to show an actual use of taxpayer
funds to support inherently religious activity, the Court let the plaintiffs get by with
nothing more than a showing that public funds provided a collateral benefit to institutions with a religious character. Put another way, the Court replaced the inquiry
required by the Establishment Clause with the inquiry allowed by the Blaine Amendment. By allowing the plaintiffs to proceed without showing the actual injury-in-fact
described in Flast, the Court assumed the existence of the taxpayer injury properly
deemed cognizable under the Establishment Clause.
Flast is controversial and problematic because of this disconnect between the
rationale for the rule it announced and the actual holding in the case. The twopronged test served to distinguish the injury made cognizable under the Establishment Clause from other taxpayer grievances. But it did not conclusively resolve the
standing issue because it was only an initial step toward the scrutiny of the factual
basis for standing required by Article III as interpreted by Frothingham and the
principle for the exception in Flast.235 Properly applied, Flast required the Court to
determine whether the plaintiffs’ showing actually supported the injury the Court
had described when it fashioned the exception in Flast,236 but the Court failed to
engage in that analysis.237 The result of this disconnect between the rationale in Flast
and its actual holding was to vastly expand the range of challenges that could be advanced under Flast in a manner wholly inconsistent with the original understanding
of the Establishment Clause.
The Court’s tortured effort to fashion a principled body of precedent in cases
involving spending programs that conferred some form of benefit to religious institutions providing secular services was a direct result of the flawed holding in Flast.
When the Court in Flast assumed the taxpayer injury needed to support standing,
it licensed a wide range of taxpayer challenges to spending programs providing some
collateral benefit to religious institutions. Reading the cases gives one the impression
235

For a recent piece forcefully highlighting this defect in Flast, see Kmiec, supra note 5,
at 510.
236
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
237
Id. at 106.
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that the assumption of injury the Court used to find standing in Flast slowly led to
a presumption of violation when the Court decided the merits.
Indeed, when one looks back at the cases proceeding under Flast, the striking
feature of the case law is an utter lack of any meaningful connection between the
actual use of public funds and any religious activity. The plaintiffs in Nyquist could
not show that the maintenance grant was actually used to finance upkeep of the
chapel.238 There was no way in which the taxpayers in Lemon could show that the
modest salary supplement actually financed any religious message uttered by the
instructor as opposed to the instruction in secular subjects the funding was meant to
finance.239 There was no way that the taxpayers in Meek, Wolman, Ball or Aguilar
could show that secular educational materials or funds used for educational activities
actually financed any religious commentary that might attend use of texts or other
instructional materials or might be uttered on a field trip. For that matter, there was
no way in which the plaintiffs in Flast could show that materials purchased with
public funds were used to finance religious activity in private schools.240
The plaintiffs in these taxpayer suits could not—and did not—attempt to show
an actual use of public funds to pay for inherently religious activity. In fact, these
cases were not about the actual use of public funds to finance religious activity. That
is why the claims advanced were based on presumptions about the use of aid provided with public funds. Indeed, the presumptions themselves rested on a hidden
premise—the implicit claim that public funds must be presumed to finance whatever
religious activity took place with materials provided with public funds (e.g., secular
instructional materials, for example) or around instruction in secular subjects partially supported by public funds.
The Court adopted these presumptions in many cases and used them as a way
to bridge the gap between the actual use of public money and religious activity. But
to its credit, the Court refused to use such a presumption of diversion to religious
use in cases where the nature of the aid or its delivery made the presumption seem
utterly untenable, for example, in cases like Allen, which involved textbooks on secular subjects.241 Still, the presumptions proved too much. It was the seemingly haphazard presumption of religious use in some cases and refusal to presume religious
use in others that made the Court’s decisions seem so contradictory and so unprincipled. The strange logic which led the Court to presume that secular instructional
materials would be used to advance religion242 also supported the presumption that
secular textbooks would be used to advance religion even though the Court refused
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to do so.243 As a result, the Court’s line-drawing failed to command respect and, to
its credit, it has rejected these cases.
The larger point is that the need to create these presumptions arose from the
assumption of standing in Flast. Indeed, it is striking that the presumptions the Court
adopted in these cases really served to remedy the defect in standing licensed by the
holding in Flast. Taken together, the presumptions the Court used to rationalize how
given forms of aid must be seen as supporting religion were nothing more than legal
fictions used to posit some link between the actual use of public funds and religious
activity. But the need to create those presumptions highlights the fact that these
taxpayer plaintiffs could not point to the constitutional infringement properly made
cognizable under the Establishment Clause in the first place—even the harm described in Flast itself. As a result of the standing error licensed by Flast, these taxpayers secured decisions on programs that they did not have standing to challenge
because the programs did not inflict the taxpayer injury properly deemed cognizable
in Flast. In this regard, it comes as no surprise that as the Court has backed away
from the presumptions that undergirded its early precedent in this area, it has become
increasingly focused on the actual use of public funds as in Agostini and Mitchell.
The good news is that the Court’s painstaking efforts to limit the boundaries of
standing under Flast have helped bring the critical flaw in Flast’s holding to light.
Many have criticized the lines drawn by the Court.244 But the Court’s steady course, a
refusal to overrule Flast on one hand, a refusal to extend the decision on the other,245
represents an earnest effort to preserve the core holding in Flast without extending
it in a way that undermines the important constitutional values served by the general
bar on taxpayer grievances created in Frothingham. Indeed, the Court’s efforts have
proven productive because they have led to an ever more refined focus on the precise nature of the injury-in-fact properly deemed cognizable under Flast.
In this regard, the decisions in Valley Forge and Winn complement one another
and show the benefits of a rigorous focus on the connection between use of the tax
and spend power and the taxpayer injury said to support standing. Both decisions
reject efforts to use taxpayer status to bootstrap standing based on an injury not
properly cognizable in Flast. In Valley Forge, the taxpayer plaintiffs could not show
a spending of their money that supported the property transfer; the taxpayers sought
to use taxpayer status to advance a claim that was not based on violation of the
personal religious liberty interest protected by the Establishment Clause as described
in Flast.246 In Winn, the taxpayer plaintiffs could not show a taxing of their money,
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The varied criticisms of the Court’s decisions are beyond the scope of this Article. Like
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that resulted in a transfer of funds to support religion.247 Taken together, Valley
Forge and Winn show that the taxpayer must show both a use of the taxing power
to extract money and a use of the spending power to finance religious activity in
order to demonstrate the taxpayer injury cognizable under the Establishment Clause.
Moreover, the requirement that taxpayers show a use of their money to finance
religion in order to demonstrate the injury properly deemed cognizable under the
Establishment Clause does not reduce a religious liberty interest to a mere economic
injury. Quite the contrary, the exercise of the tax and spend power to coerce support
for religion is made cognizable under the Establishment Clause principally because
of the non-economic offense against the religious liberty of the citizen who objects
to this use of their funds. The point is that the dollars-and-cents injury provides the
necessary foundation for non-economic dimension of the injury cognizable under
the Establishment Clause.
Put another way, it is the dollars-and-cents injury caused by the abuse of the tax
and spend power that yields the precise injury to the conscience that the Establishment Clause prohibits, that is, the misuse of the individual taxpayer’s monies to
support religion. Consequently, the economic injury must be shown in order to fit
within the rule of Flast and seek redress for an injury with economic and noneconomic dimensions. It is this dollars-and-cents injury which distinguishes the
injury made cognizable in Flast from the generalized grievance shared by all taxpayers who object to a use of the tax and spend power in a way that may benefit religion but does not involve a use of their money to finance religious activity.248
It must be emphasized that the focus on the actual use of public funds is an
essential element of the standing inquiry. In Flast, the Court reasoned that the particular personal injury it described, the injury caused by use of the tax and spend
power to coerce financial support for inherently religious activity, gave the taxpayer
a personal stake in the matter different in kind from taxpayer objections to other
spending programs.249 The specific personal injury described in Flast must be shown
to support standing. Otherwise, the taxpayer has only a generalized grievance about the
collateral benefits these programs confer on religious institutions, not the personal
247

See Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
For this reason, I disagree with those who believe “Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Winn
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injury caused by a use of the tax power to confiscate a citizen’s money which is later
used to finance religious activity. This vital distinction explains why the Court consistently examines the injury alleged by the taxpayer as an element of standing and
the Court’s failure to make this inquiry in other cases cannot justify a reclassification
of this question as one solely related to the merits as the Court made plain in Winn.250
For these reasons , disagree with those who have criticized the decision in Winn
on the grounds that “asserting that the taxpayer harm recognized by the Establishment Clause occurs only when the taxpayer’s funds flow directly into religious
coffers . . . contradicts not only common sense but the historical record.”251 The
historical support for the argument is the claim that such a view of the taxpayer
injury is inconsistent with Madison’s position because the General Assessment bill
to which Madison objected allowed undesignated sums to be appropriated for
“seminaries of learning” but Madison opposed the bill nonetheless.252
Setting aside the larger question of what weight should be given to Madison’s
views, the claim is implausible. The Memorial and Remonstrance is directed towards the provisions of the bill that allowed civil power to coerce support for inherently religious activity; it does not take issue with the use of civil law to fund
education as allowed by the “seminaries” provision.253 Assuming the “seminaries”
provision was a purely secular alternative (a point where skepticism would be merited), the absence of any objection to this provision in the Memorial and Remonstrance makes sense because there was little question that the state could use its tax
and spend power to support education.
Moreover, as the Court noted in Winn, there is good reason to believe that
“[h]owever the ‘seminaries’ provision might have functioned in practice, critics took
the position that the proposed bill threatened compulsory religious contributions.”254
It seems much more plausible to think that the “seminaries” provision was seen as
a window-dressing provision which, however it worked, could not excuse the use
of civil authority to compel support for religion. Certainly that is how the Memorial
and Remonstrance treats the bill.255
250
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Winn’s standing analysis is a great success, not a failure. Winn shows the benefit
of a refined focus on the precise use of the tax and spend power that inflicts the
taxpayer injury properly deemed cognizable under the Establishment Clause because
it produces results consistent with the original understanding of that provision. In
Winn, there was no question that the state had used its tax power in a way that provided some benefit to religion by making private funds more readily available to private
schools, including religious schools.256 But the Court held that this use of the taxing
power did not inflict the injury in fact needed to confer standing under Flast.257
The taxpayers in Winn could not show the injury needed to support standing
because they could not show the specific use of the taxing power described in
Flast.258 More specifically, they could not show a use of the taxing power to take
money from them that was later used to finance religion.259 Therefore the taxpayers
could not show the personal injury caused by a misuse of their money that gives rise
to the personal stake required to support standing under the Establishment Clause.260
As a result, their objection to the collateral benefit that the state’s use of the taxing
power conferred on religious institutions was properly characterized as a generalized
taxpayer grievance barred by Frothingham.261
The Court should employ this refined focus when it evaluates challenges to
congressional use of the spending power to determine whether it inflicts the taxpayer
injury properly deemed cognizable under the Establishment Clause. More specifically, the Court should require the taxpayer to demonstrate that public funds are
actually being used to finance inherently religious activity. A taxpayer who can
show such a use of public funds can demonstrate an injury caused by the spending
power properly deemed cognizable under the Establishment Clause as described in
Everson and Flast.
By the same token, a taxpayer unable to show such a use of public funds to
support inherently religious activity is like the taxpayer in Winn. The taxpayer may
be able to show a use of the spending power that provides a collateral benefit to
religion, but the taxpayer cannot show a use of public money that’s actually prohibited by the Establishment Clause because the taxpayer cannot show a use of her
funds to finance inherently religious activity. As a result, the taxpayer cannot show
the personal injury caused by a misuse of his funds that gives rise to the personal
stake needed to support standing under the Establishment Clause. Therefore, the
objection to the use of the spending power is properly characterized as a generalized
grievance barred by Frothingham, not the personal injury made cognizable by the
rationale in Flast.
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Flast does not need to be overruled; it needs to be limited along the lines suggested here. Winn has precisely defined the use of the taxing power that must be
shown to support standing. The Court should scrutinize claims that the spending
power has produced an injury sufficient to support standing under the Establishment
Clause in the same way. When the Court applies Flast it must insist that the taxpayer
show a use of the spending power that results in the actual use of public funds to
finance inherently religious activity. If the Court does so, it will succeed in a reform
of Flast that is both principled and consistent with the original understanding of the
First Amendment.

